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Applications for Benefits: Due Process,
Equal Protection, and the Right to Be
Free from Arbitrary Procedures
Virginia T. Vance*
On January 31, 2003, the Los Angeles Times reported that government-
contracted employees shredded approximately 90,000 documents at the
INS California Service Center in Laguna Niguel. Among those documents
shredded were applications for political asylum and applications for visas.
According to federal prosecutors, an inability to keep up with mounting
paperwork motivated the contract employees to engage in the "shredding
spree." The responsible employees now face federal charges.'
Query: What happens when applicants for state benefits face similar
difficulties?
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I. Introduction
In 1970, the Supreme Court established that the termination of a person's
welfare benefits demanded procedural due process protections, finding that
welfare benefits are a statutorily created entitlement and thus a property
2interest. Ten years later, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to
address whether the safeguards of procedural due process covered an applicant
for welfare benefits.3 In fact, over the past twenty years, the Court has
repeatedly declined to address the issue of whether an applicant for benefits
enjoys the same procedural due process protections as a person already
receiving the same benefits or, for that matter, whether an applicant receives
any procedural due process protections.4 Most recently, in American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,' the Court narrowly dodged
the issue once more.6 The Court's repeated acknowledgement of the issue, and
habitual avoidance of it, leaves a small but significant question looming over a
2. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 & n.8 (1970) (finding that the
termination of an entitlement created by statute "involves state action that adjudicates important
rights" and stating that welfare benefits are "more like 'property' than a 'gratuity"').
3. See Peer v. Griffeth, 445 U.S. 970,970-71 (1980) (mem.) (order denying certiorari)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting a question as to whether applicants for welfare benefits enjoy
the same protections as those already receiving benefits).
4. See, e.g., Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986) (stating that the Court has never
held that procedural due process protects applicants for benefits); Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985) (failing to reach the question regarding
whether there is a property right in an application for federal veterans' benefits that implicates
the Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment); Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 470 U.S. 1018,
1021 (1985) (mem.) (order denying certiorari) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
Court has never determined whether applicants for general assistance have a protected property
interest).
5. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,43-44 (1999) (avoiding the
issue of whether an employer or insurer may withhold medical treatment by finding issuers not
to be "state actors"). For a discussion of the facts and reasoning of American Manufacturers,
see infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
6. Id. at 61 n. 13 (refusing to address the issue of whether there was a property interest in
claims for payment under a state-regulated workers compensation act, as distinct from payment
itself, because respondents did not contend such an interest).
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large body of law: Is due process implicated when a person applies for a state
benefit, and if not, does an applicant have any claim against a state agency
when she feels that the state has arbitrarily denied her application for benefits?
7
Originally identified as one of the "cracks" in "the new property" by
Professor William Van Alstyne, the problem of an applicant's inability to
obtain procedural protections to ensure a nonarbitrary denial of benefits still
lurks within the framework of the modem administrative state.' As Professor
Van Alstyne observes:
When a litigant is adversely affected entirely as a predictable consequence
of procedural grossness... he is in serious difficulty. The essence of his
complaint is to the felt unfairness of procedural grossness itself-that it
builds in such a large margin of probable mistake as itself to be intolerable
in a humane society. The difficulty of his position appears to be, however,
that unlike his freedoms of speech, association, assembly, religion, and
petition ... , and unlike his entitlement to privacy ... , he cannot anchor a
claim to freedom from procedural grossness per se in any clause of the
Constitution.
9
Current case law suggests that statutory construction can create a property
right that guarantees some applicants procedural due process because of the
nature of the interest at stake and the amount of government discretion involved
in evaluating the application.' ° However, other applicants who cannot point to
7. This Note primarily discusses this question in the context of state benefits, because the
Administrative Procedure Act provides some measure of procedural due process protection,
though very minimal, to applicants for most federal benefit programs. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e)
(2000) (requiring notice of denial and reasons for that denial for all applications). Specifically,
the statute states:
Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written
application, petition, or other request of an interested person made in connection
with any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior denial or when the denial
is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the
grounds for denial.
Id.
8. See William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process
in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445,449-51 (1977) (identifying the problem a
litigant may face if the government denies her application without reason as partly resulting
from the constitution's failure to specifically identify a right to "freedom from procedural
grossness").
9. Id. at 450-5 1.
10. See, e.g., Mallette v. Arlington County Employees' Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91
F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a statute granting a conditional benefit created an
expectation of a benefit, and thus procedural due process was needed to protect the property
interest in the application). The Court also found that in this particular case the "claim of
entitlement... [was] bolstered by the nature of the benefit at stake," which was an employee's
disability retirement benefits. Id. at 636; see also Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v.
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such a statutorily created right still face unsatisfactory answers as to why the
government did not extend them a particular benefit.' 1 Some state courts have
sought to eliminate this problem and create uniform results by finding no
property interest in any application for benefits.' 2 This approach seems
arbitrary because in the absence of some sort of statutory protection of fair
process, the applicant has no remedy for a mistaken denial of benefits.' 3 Thus,
the current state of the law leaves us with two possible alternatives: Either
there is a limited right to procedural due process in specific circumstances as
Derwinski, 994 F.2d 583, 588 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[Tlhe district court correctly concluded that
both applicants for and recipients of [Service-Connected Death and Disability (SCDD)] benefits
possess a constitutionally protected interest in those benefits."); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v.
Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11 th Cir. 1989) (concluding that an entitlement interest exists in
the right to apply for the Special Agricultural Worker program); Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748,
752 (1 st Cir. 1973) (finding that the freedom to make use of one's own motor vehicle is a liberty
interest that due process protects, whether those proceedings relate to the suspension of a license
or to the application for a license); Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp.
1302, 1312 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("The court concludes that recipients and applicants have a
protected property interest in their claims to SCDD benefits."), rev'd on other grounds, 473
U.S. 305 (1985); Harris v. Lukhard, 547 F. Supp. 1015, 1027 (W.D. Va. 1982) ("Viewing the
Social Security Act and the Virginia regulations which administer the act as a whole, the Court
concludes that these statutes and regulations create a legitimate entitlement and expectancy in
Medicaid benefits for applicants who claim to meet the eligibility requirements."); Davis v.
United States, 415 F. Supp. 1086, 1091-92 (D. Kan. 1976) (finding a property interest in an
application for compensation for a work-related injury in prison because statutory language
created a "legitimate claim of expectancy" of approval of the application if it fulfilled an
objective medical standard for qualification).
II. See Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding no
property right in a license or certificate of approval for an automobile junkyard despite the
arbitrary actions of the state zoning board of appeals in denying the application because the
evaluation standards set forth by the state gave the zoning board broad discretion in granting or
denying licenses); City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, 966 F. Supp. 395,401
(M.D.N.C. 1997) (determining that no legitimate claim of entitlement to contract award was
present because statutory language provided broad discretion to the local government in making
its award decision).
12. See, e.g., Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123 (Cal. App. 1972)
(finding no "general requirement for an evidentiary hearing in connection with the denial of an
application for welfare benefits"); Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 479 A.2d 1304, 1308 (Me.
1984) ("In Maine a general assistance applicant has no property interest in benefits until he has
been found qualified and eligible by the local authority .. "); Sumpter v. White Plains Hous.
Auth., 278 N. E.2d 892, 894 (N.Y. 1972) ("[A] party aggrieved by loss of a pre-existing right or
privilege may enjoy procedural rights not available to one denied the right or privilege in the
first instance.").
13. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 448-51 (discussing the "predicament of an
individual foreclosed from some connection with government for a reason that he is unable to
ascertain at all"); see also supra text accompanying note 8 (describing an applicant's difficulties
in obtaining procedural protections).
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defined by the property interest created by state statute, or there is absolutely no
protection for applicants.
One may ask why it matters whether applications for benefits ought to
trigger any due process concerns. The answer is simple: If the Court fails to
acknowledge any due process concerns and sustains arbitrary and capricious
state decisions with respect to any given application, it would in essence be
signing off on a state government's right to treat its citizens arbitrarily and
irrationally.' 4 For instance, a city zoning review board with broad discretion
could deny any real consideration to an application for a license or certificate of
location for ajunkyard by rejecting the application as a favor to the mayor.' 5 In
this situation, if the state did not provide any right to appeal or a right to sue
under its own laws, the government disappoints a citizen's expectation that her
government will at least observe minimal standards of fairness and rationality
when considering her application.16 Legitimizing a state's arbitrary treatment
of its citizens, irrespective of the discretion level a state actor enjoys in
distributing a benefit, sets a dangerous precedent. Taking certain federal circuit
court cases seriously, a state could easily escape its obligation to observe due
process in certain circumstances by rewriting statutes to provide state
decisionmakers with higher levels of discretion.' 7 Thus, decisions that do not
14. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 450-51 (discussing the difficulty in challenging
adverse decisions when a person believes that inadequate procedural protections, which create a
significant potential for the mistaken denial of benefits, caused the denial).
15. See Yale Auto Parts, 758 F.2d at 56 (citing state superior court's findings of fact that
the local zoning board had acted arbitrarily and against public policy in denying application for
license before a hearing). The Second Circuit later found that there was no property interest in a
license or certificate of approval and, hence, no right to due process protection, even though the
zoning board violated procedures set forth by state law. Id. at 58-59.
16. See id. at 58-59 ("[E]ven an outright violation of state law in the denial of a license
will not necessarily provide the basis for a federal claim.., at least when the applicant has a
state law remedy."); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 487 (discussing the possibility of
locating the "freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures" in a liberty interest). As Van
Alstyne states:
There is ... an implication that the protected essences of personal freedom include
a freedom from fundamentally unfair modes of governmental action, an immunity
(if you will) from procedural arbitrariness .... Such a liberty may be at least as old
as the idea of the social contract, which informs so much of our Constitution.
Id.
17. See, e.g., Med Corp., Inc. v. City of Lima, 296 F.3d 404,409 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[A]
party cannot possess a property interest in the receipt of a benefit when the state's decision to
award or withhold the benefit is wholly discretionary."); Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of
Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56,62 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Although procedural requirements ordinarily do not
transform a unilateral expectation into a protected property interest, such an interest is created
'if the procedural requirements are intended to be a significant substantive restriction on...
decision making."' (quoting Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1984))); Mahone
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acknowledge an individual's right to be free from procedural grossness threaten
applications for benefits currently covered by procedural due process under the
federal court property interest paradigm.
Although courts have primarily attempted to address this issue under the
framework of a property interest that triggers procedural due process,"
refraining the issue as a liberty interest that implicates substantive due process
may help cure the problem.' 9 In the alternative, recent Supreme Court
precedent would seem to promote the use of equal protection to protect citizens
from utterly arbitmray treatment by a state government.20
This Note discusses the various means by which a plaintiff could attempt
to state a claim against a state agency she feels has arbitrarily denied her
application for benefits. In attempting to seal these cracks in "the new
property,"' Part H examines applications for benefits as property interests, an
v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 931 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding no property interest in petition
for annexation of land and stating that the court found "nothing to suggest that this policy is
anything more than ... a guiding principle" that assists the utility district in exercising its
discretionary power). But see People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626 (Cal. 1979) (criticizing the
theory that the broad discretion of decisionmakers removes the protections of procedural due
process). The California Supreme Court reasoned that such a conclusion would allow states to
bypass the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Specifically, it stated:
[A]s long as the interest is not one that would otherwise fall within the scope of
constitutional concepts of liberty, the state may "define it out" of the due process
clause by specifying that it is subject to the unconditional discretion of the person
in charge of its administration; further, the state may apparently limit the scope of
the clause in this manner irrespective of the extent to which "grievous loss" or
"substantial adverse impact" results. The Supreme Court's doctrine has thus been
criticized as ultimately leading to circular reasoning that contravenes the clause by
leaving the state free to decide whether and to what extent procedures are to be
followed in dealings with its citizens without regard to federal standards.
Id. (citations omitted).
18. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing circuit court precedents that find
a property interest in statutory language that gives rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement
protected by procedural due process).
19. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 487 (suggesting that liberty interest in a person's
freedom to be free from procedural grossness may be found in substantive due process, thus
triggering procedural safeguards).
20. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,565 (2000) (per curiam) (upholding
equal protection claim brought by class of one to address plaintiffs claim that she had been
treated arbitrarily and differently from other similarly situated persons). For further discussion
of Village of Willowbrook, see infra Part IV.B. Cf Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d
386, 387-89 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding valid equal protection claim for plaintiff under theory of
"subjective ill will"), aff'd, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
21. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 445 (labeling problems within case law
interpretation of government benefits, such as the lack of protection for applicants for benefits,
in the title of his article, Cracks in "the New Property).
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approach utilized by several federal circuit courts. Next, Part III discusses
the idea that liberty interests rooted in substantive due process may protect
plaintiffs from such arbitrary treatment. Part IV analyzes equal protection as
a viable tool to overcome the inherent difficulties presented in finding a
liberty or property interest that implicates procedural or substantive due
process. This Note concludes that locating a liberty interest under
substantive due process effectively solves the problem; however, the current
Supreme Court may be more likely to honor an equal protection claim as a
means of providing relief to a citizen who suffers from an utterly arbitrary
adverse government decision.22
II. Procedural Due Process and the Property Interest Paradigm
The Supreme Court's comments in American Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Sullivan23 set the stage for the ongoing debate over due
process protections and whether they should be afforded to applicants for
benefits, though the Court managed to skirt the issue. In this case, the Court
considered Pennsylvania's workers' compensation scheme.24 To control costs,
the state formed a "utilization review" procedure that analyzed the
reasonableness of workers' claims before an insurer paid any medical
expenses.25  Respondents claimed that the state, through the Workers'
Compensation Bureau of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry,
withheld payment without predeprivation notice and without an opportunity to
be heard in violation of due process. 26 In response to these claims, the Court
noted that a deprivation of a constitutional right under the Fourteenth
Amendment, as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, requires a state actor.27  By
attributing all withholding decisions to the private insurer, the Court found that
the respondents failed to meet the requirements of their § 1983 claim because
no state action was implicated in the withholding of the medical payments.
28
22. See Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 565 (2000) (per curiam) (finding valid an
equal protection claim asserting that the Village treated plaintiff arbitrarily and differently from
similarly situated persons).
23. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
24. Id. at44.
25. Id. at 45-46.
26. Id. at 46-47.
27. See id. at 50 ("[Tlhe party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor." (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982))).
28. Id. at 58.
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The Court then evaluated "[w]hether the Due Process Clause requires workers'
compensation insurers to pay disputed medical bills prior to a determination
that the medical treatment was reasonable and necessary."29 By phrasing the
question in this manner, the Court avoided the broader question of whether a
claim or application for benefit payments represented a property interest that
deserved procedural protections. Ultimately, the Court found no property
interest in payments for medical treatments before a determination of the
payments' reasonableness and necessity, because the state statute specifically
defined the right as a right to necessary and reasonable payments.
3F
Though the majority easily discarded the issue of a property right in the
application (or claim) itself without elaboration,32 Justice Ginsburg addressed
the issue directly: "I do not doubt ... that due process requires fair procedures
for the adjudication of respondents' claims for workers' compensation benefits,
including medical care. 3 3 Justice Stevens appeared to agree with this view,
reasoning that because the procedures in place for the utilization review
determined the scope of a plaintiffrs property interest in the benefit, due process
required that the procedures to determine the scope of the benefit be fair.
34
Thus, at least two Justices support the view that a property interest may exist in
an application for a benefit, thereby implicating the procedural concerns of due
process.
Although the Supreme Court has left the issue open, the circuit courts
seem to agree that a property interest in an application will arise if a statute
29. See id. at 59 (quoting petition for certiorari).
30. See id. at 61 n. 13 (declining to determine whether plaintiffs had a property interest in
their claims for payment because respondents did not contend that they had such an interest).
31. See id. at 60-61 (stating that the employee's property interest only vests upon the
clearing of two hurdles). As the Court stated:
[F]or an employee's property interest in the payment of medical benefits to attach
under state law, the employee must clear two hurdles: First, the employee must
prove that an employer is liable for a work-related injury, and second, he must
establish that the particular medical treatment at issue is reasonable and necessary.
Only then does the employee's interest parallel that of the beneficiary of welfare
assistance in Goldberg and the recipient of disability benefits in Mathews.
Id.
32. See id. at 61 n. 13 (declining to address whether there was a property interest in the
claims for payment because the respondents failed to argue such an interest).
33. Id. at 62 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 63 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens cites
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S 422 (1982), for support in finding a property interest
in the claim at issue in American Manufacturers. Id. at 63-64. In Logan, the Court found that
a statute creating a right to use adjudicatory procedures found in an employment law was a
protected property interest. Logan, 455 U.S. at 429-30.
890
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narrows the decisionmaker's discretion to specific eligibility criteria and the
statute creates a legitimate claim of entitlement to that benefit if the applicant
meets the specific eligibility criteria.35 Mere guidelines that instruct a
decisionmaker's discretion typically do not create a property interest.36 The
Supreme Court's decision in Board of Regents v. Roth37 guides the lower
35. See, e.g., Mallette v. Arlington County Employees' Supplemental Ret. Sys. 11, 91 F.3d
630, 635 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a county ordinance stating that "qualifying members 'shall
receive' benefits" created a "'legitimate claim of entitlement"' in the application for the benefit);
Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Derwinski, 994 F.2d 583,588 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he
district court correctly concluded that both applicants for and recipients of SCDD benefits
possess a constitutionally protected interest in those benefits."); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v.
Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11 th Cir. 1989) (concluding that an entitlement interest exists in
the right to apply for Special Agricultural Worker status because Congress promulgated rules
that restricted the discretion of decisionmakers to grant benefits under the system); Daniels v.
Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he authorizing statute coupled
with the implementing regulations of the county creates a legitimate claim of entitlement and
expectancy of benefits in persons who claim to meet the eligibility requirements." (quoting
Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 121 (9th Cir. 1979))); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1215
(9th Cir. 1982) (finding that applicants for federal rent subsidies have a property interest in the
application for those subsidies because "the authorizing statute coupled with the implementing
regulations of the county creates a legitimate claim of entitlement and expectancy of benefits in
persons who claim to meet the eligibility requirements" (quoting Griffeth, 603 F.2d at 121));
Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1278 n.35 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Applicants who have met the
objective eligibility criteria of a wide variety of governmental programs have been held to be
entitled to protection under the due process clause.").
36. See, e.g., Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1116
(10th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he state law's requirement that zoning decisions be reasonable... is
insufficient to confer upon the applicant a legitimate claim of entitlement."); Madhone v.
Addicks Utility Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 930-31 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding no property interest in
property owner's application for annexation by a municipal utility district because the court
"found nothing to suggest that this policy is anything more than that-a guiding principle which
each district is to consider when making annexation decisions"); Davis v. Ball Mem'l Hosp.
Ass'n, 640 F.2d 30, 38 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that indigent patients had no property right in
uncompensated medical services because "mere abstract qualification for the program [was]
insufficient and that any expectation of receiving benefits [was] not fully justified"); Jacobson v.
Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that decisionmaker's discretion to deny a
license, limited only by reasonableness requirement, did not create a property interest, but that
"[a] property interest may be created if 'procedural' requirements are intended to operate as a
significant substantive restriction on the basis for an agency's actions").
37. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (discussing the nature of a
property interest). In Roth, a Wisconsin state university informed the respondent, an instructor
hired for a specific term, that the university would not rehire him. Id. at 566. Though he had no
tenure rights, the respondent challenged the university's decision, stating that the university
failed to give him notice of any reason for their adverse hiring decision. Id. at 568. The Court
held that respondent had no right to a statement of reasons or a hearing because he had no
legitimate claim of entitlement to re-employment. Id. at 578. Specifically, the Court stated, "To
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. at 577. Property rights, according to the Court, "are
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courts' ability to find a property interest in some applications. 38 The Roth court
stated that property interests are creations of state law-"rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits."
39
Mallette v. Arlington County Employees'Supplemental Retirement System
I140 provides a good example of the type of analysis a court uses when
determining whether an applicant has a property interest in her application for
benefits. In Mallette, the plaintiff challenged a denial of her application for
service-related disability benefits.4' The plaintiff suffered from spina bifida, a
condition that became aggravated after various work-related duties.42 As a
result of these injuries, the plaintiff received worker's compensation benefits
from 1983 through June 6, 1993, the end of the maximum statutory term for
disability benefits.43 The termination notice of the worker's compensation
benefits led the plaintiff to believe that her benefits would convert to service-
related retirement benefits. 44 The plaintiff submitted her application for
retirement benefits on March 17, 1993, and a subsequent visit to a physician for
the retirement system resulted in a recommendation that the plaintiff receive
those benefits.45 The plaintiff received notice that the retirement system's
board of trustees would consider her application on July 1, 1993, and the board
encouraged the plaintiff to attend this hearing.46 At this hearing, the plaintiff,
not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules
or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits." Id.
38. See, e.g., Mallette v. Arlington County Employees' Supplemental Ret. Sys. 11, 91 F.3d
630, 634-35 (4th Cir. 1996) (using Roth's interpretation of a legitimate claim of entitlement to
determine whether plaintiff has a property interest in an application for retirement disability
benefits); Jacobs, Vinconsi & Jacobs, 927 F.2d at 1116 (citing Roth and stating that "[a]
property interest protected by the due process clause results from a legitimate claim of
entitlement created and defined 'by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law'" (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577)); Daniels v. Woodbury
County, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Roth's language regarding legitimate
claims of entitlemnt and determining that Iowa relief statute created such an interest for
applicants).
39. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
40. Mallette v. Arlington County Employees' Supplemental Ret. Sys. 11, 91 F.3d 630 (4th
Cir. 1996).
41. Id. at 632.
42. Id. at 632-33.





unaccompanied by counsel, learned that the retirement system's physician had
revised his medical report and recommended denying the plaintiff's
applicationY The plaintiff received no opportunity to question the doctor or
the system administrator and the board ultimately denied the plaintiffs
application. 48  After unsuccessfully seeking an administrative remedy, the
plaintiff filed a complaint in district court, alleging due process and equal
protection violations.
49
The court began its analysis by reviewing the two-part inquiry made in
cases that allege a due process violation: 50 First, did the plaintiff lose an
interest that constitutes life, liberty, or property, and if so, did the plaintiff
receive adequate procedural protection? 5' Citing Roth and Justice O'Connor's
discussion of administrative discretion in Board ofPardons v. Allen,52 the court
47. Id.
48. Id. at 634.
49. Id.
50. See id. ("[I]t is by now axiomatic that the language of the Due Process Clause-'nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...'-
calls for two separate inquiries in evaluating an alleged procedural due process violation.").
51. Id.
52. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369,382 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
Roth and concluding that an entitlement is only created if a decisionmaker's discretion is
constrained by law). In Board of Pardons, Montana prisoners not granted parole filed suit on
behalf of prisoners who were eligible for parole or may become eligible for parole in the future.
Id. at 370-71. Specifically, the prisoners claimed that the Montana Board of Pardons had
denied prisoners their civil rights because the Board neither followed statutory criteria to
determine parole nor provided reasons for denying parole. Id. at 371. The district court
determined that the case was controlled by Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Id. "In Greenholtz the Court held that, despite the necessarily
subjective and predictive nature of the parole-release decision, state statutes may create liberty
interests in parole release that are entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause." Id.
(citations omitted). The appeals court reversed the district court's decision. Id. at 372. The
Court agreed with the district court and found that Greenholtz governed the case. Id. at 378.
Specifically, the Court found that even though the factors guiding the Board were subjective,
these factors significantly limited the discretion of the Board in granting parole, and thus created
a liberty interest. Id. at 379-8 1. However, in her dissent, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the
finding that the statute limited the discretion of the Board in a meaningful way. Id. at 382-83
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice O'Connor stated:
In my view, the distinction between an "entitlement" and a mere "expectancy" must
necessarily depend on the degree to which the decisionmakers' discretion is
constrained by law. An individual simply has nothing more than a mere hope of
receiving a benefit unless the decision to confer that benefit is in a real sense
channeled by law. Because the crucial inquiry in determining the creation of a
protected interest is whether a statutory entitlement is created, it cannot be
sufficient merely to point to the existence of some "standard." Instead, to give rise
to a protected liberty interest, the statute must act to limit meaningfully the
discretion of the decisionmakers.
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focused on whether the county ordinance curbed the decisionmaker's discretion
in granting or denying the benefit. 53 Noting that the county ordinance spoke in
mandatory terms-"qualifying members 'shall receive' benefits"-and finding
that particularized eligibility criteria substantially limited the decisionmaker's
discretion, the court found that the ordinance created a "legitimate claim of
entitlement" in the benefits for those persons who meet the eligibility
requirements.54 The nature of the benefit, a retirement fund, also influenced the
court's decision that the application constituted a property interest. 55 In
addition, the court refused to entertain a distinction between applicants for
benefits and recipients of benefits in determining a property interest.56
Specifically, the court stated:
We join our sister courts in rejecting the mechanical and simplistic
applicant/recipient distinction where a statute mandates the payment of
benefits to eligible applicants based on objective, particularized criteria.
As explained in Roth, the Supreme Court's procedural due process
jurisprudence focuses on whether statutory provisions create a right, not
whether benefits have been received in the past. The Arlington Retirement
System creates in its members a legitimate expectation of receiving benefits
and a consequent right to be heard. Eligible applicants are no less entitled
to that expectation than are eligible recipients, and the potential
consequences of denying disability benefits are no less potentially dire than
those of revoking them. 7
Thus, the court concluded that due process would apply to the plaintiff's
application for benefits.5"
Id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53. Mallette v. Arlington County Employees Supplemental Ret. Sys. 11,91 F.3d 630,635
(4th Cir. 1996).
54. Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 636. As the court stated:
The statutory claim -of entitlement in this case is bolstered by the nature of the
benefit at stake. The right to payment of disability retirement benefits arises by
virtue of past labor services and past contributions to a disability fund. Member
employees, who contribute their earnings to the system, reasonably expect that
accrued benefits will be waiting if they need them and qualify for them. As a
member of the class of persons the Retirement System was intended to protect and
benefit, Mallette has more than an abstract desire for the benefits. If she can make
a prima facie case of eligibility, she has a property interest in those benefits and an
accompanying right to be heard.
Id.
56. See id. at 638 (following the lead of other courts of appeals in declining to make a
distinction between applicants and recipients of benefits).
57. Id. at 639-40 (citations omitted).
58. Id.
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The court noted that due process was a flexible notion and that a balancing
of three factors would determine what process was due: (1) the private interest
at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation; and (3) the government's
interest, including the financial and administrative burdens that additional
procedures would require.59 Balancing these factors, the court found that the
procedures in place in evaluating the plaintiff's application deprived her of due
process.60 In particular, the court found that, based on the plaintiffs account of
events, she "could not have understood the adverse nature of the hearing, could
not have adequately evaluated her need for counsel, and could not have
prepared appropriate rebuttal evidence."''6 The court determined that there was
a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation and that the plaintiff ultimately
deserved more process than she received. 62  Thus, on remand, the court
required the district court to balance the three factors to determine how much
more process the plaintiff was due.63
Mallette represents the typical analysis for due process challenges to
denials of applications. The requirement that there be specific criteria that
guide a decisionmaker in granting and denying mandatory benefits-that is,
benefits that the decisionmaker must grant if the applicant meets the statutorily
defined criteria-essentially bars due process claims for applications for
benefits when the decisionmaker's discretion is less restricted. 64 Despite the
59. Id. at 640 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
60. See id. ("These factors lead us to conclude that Mallette has alleged facts sufficient to
persuade a reasonable factfinder that she was deprived of the minimum procedural safeguards
guaranteed her under the circumstances.").
61. Id. at 641.
62. See id. ("Because we find sufficient evidence in the record to suggest that Mallette did
not receive notice 'reasonably calculated' to afford her a meaningful opportunity to present her
side at a hearing before the System's Board of Trustees, we remand the case for further
proceedings.").
63. Id. The court also noted that an applicant sometimes may be due less process than a
current recipient of benefits. Id. at 640 n.5. As the court explained:
That is because applications for benefits often turn on objective factors not
productively developed in a hearing, such as age or length of employment. But
where eligibility turns on subjective factors, an applicant no less than a recipient is
entitled to an opportunity to be heard.
Id.
64. Compare Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L.
REv. 885,963 (2000) ("[A] purely discretionary benefit-one that a government agent is free to
dispense or withhold at will-does not qualify [as an entitlement]."), with Three Rivers
Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118, 1127-28 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (finding a
limited property interest in submitting bids for a cable television contract where the city retained
the right to reject all bids). In Three Rivers, the plaintiffs and three other companies submitted a
bid to provide a cable television service to the city of Pittsburgh. Id. at 1120. The council
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fact that a majority of federal courts adopt this approach to applications for
benefits, 65 some debate remains as to whether an application for benefits should
rejected all four bids for failure to comply with the Cable Communications Ordinance (CCO)
and the Request for Proposals (RFP). Id. All four companies received an opportunity to submit
new bids, but the council rejected these bids again for noncompliance and refused to permit
amendments to the bids. Id. at 1120-21. The plaintiffs asserted that one bidder, Warner, met
secretly with the Bureau of Cable Communications, learned the specific deficiencies with its
second bid, and that later the Bureau allowed this bidder to correct at least one of the
deficiencies. Id. at 1121. One of the plaintiffs also asserted that its second bid complied with
the CCO and RFP. Id. The council ultimately awarded the contract to Warner. Id. The
plaintiffs filed an action claiming that: (1) the council award disregarded recommendations
from the Bureau of Cable Communications and the Cable Communications Advisory
Committee that the contract be awarded to Three Rivers; (2) the award ignored the fact that
Warner's bid contained deficiencies; (3) the award was the result of a sham proceeding designed
to favor Warner; and (4) the reason that the council provided for the award was "infirm since the
specifications regarding that program were unconstitutionally vague." Id. As to the due process
claim, the district court acknowledged that it was difficult to ascertain the nature and source of
the property interest. Id. at 1128. However, the court said that the property interest would not
arise from adherence to the statutory procedures delineated for the CCO and RFP. Id. The
court then stated that if there was a property interest, it would be located in the "benefit whose
enjoyment is sought to be regulated by the procedure; namely, the award of the contract." Id. at
1129. Reviewing the statutory language of the CCO, the City's Home Rule Charter and the City
Code, the court determined that although the city had no obligation to award a contract, once it
chose to award such a contract, it had to award the contract to the lowest bidder. Id. at 1130. In
determining the lowest bidder, city statutes demanded that the "awarding party must exercise its
discretion in a non-arbitrary fashion." Id. at 1131. Specifically, the court found, "The due
process to which one possessing the protected interest was entitled was the non-arbitrary
exercise by the city of its discretion in making the award." Id. Though the court recognized that
it could be argued that only one of the bidders would be entitled to due process-"a non-
arbitrary evaluation of its bid"-it stated that the spirit of cases such as Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (holding that "the expectancy of
release provided in [the] statute is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection") and
Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1007 (3d Cir. 1980) ("We hold that a state-created liberty
interest in work release arises when a prisoner meets all eligibility requirements under the state
regulations and the exercise of the prison authorities' discretion is consistent with work release
policy.") supported the notion that Three Rivers only needed to establish its status as a bidder to
invoke due process protection. Id. at 1131-32 n.14. This view is an extremely liberal reading
of the property interest rule created by the circuit courts, in that discretion limited by rationality
does not appear to fit within the definition of specific eligibility requirements that usually confer
a property interest in an application for benefits.
65. See Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 470 U.S. 1018, 1021 (1985) (mem.) (orderdenying
cert.) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court has never determined whether
applicants for general assistance have an interest protected by due process, but finding that most
lower courts have found such an interest). As Justice O'Connor explained:
One would think that where state law creates an entitlement to general assistance
based on certain substantive conditions, there ... results a property interest that
warrants at least some procedural safeguards. . .. Although this Court has never
addressed the issue whether applicants for general assistance have a protected
property interest..., the weight of authority among lower courts is [that they
have].
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constitute a property interest.66 Even though the Supreme Court has expressly
held that a liberty interest can arise from statutory language that creates a mere
expectation of a benefit,67 the Court has thus far declined to transfer this idea
into the property realm in discussing applications for benefits.68
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
66. See Peer v. Griffeth, 445 U.S. 970, 970 (1980) (mem.) (order denying cert.)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (questioning whether state-mandated welfare benefits should cue
procedural safeguards for applicants for those benefits and citing differing opinions of what
actually constitutes a property interest for due process concerns); see also Merrill, supra note
64, at 967 n.299 (arguing that no property right should vest in an application for benefits).
Professor Merrill is critical of the idea that applications for benefits can trigger the protection of
due process, stating that "[t]he positivist trap in the form of too much property is a [great]
concern, given the vast range of government 'entitlements' established by existing
nonconstitutional law." Id. at 968. Regarding applications for benefits specifically, he states:
Lower courts have reached varying results in considering whether procedural due
process guarantees apply to government decisions denying initial claims to benefits,
and the Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the question .... The modified
Memphis Light/Logan definition would resolve this dispute by finding no property
unless the state seeks to terminate a presently existing entitlement. This result is
consistent not only with the perceptions that individuals experience a loss of
existing benefits more sharply than they do the failure to gain new benefits, but,
more importantly, with the objective of avoiding the too-much-property trap, with
the inevitable watering-down of protections that follows for claimants with more
serious claims.
Id. at 967 n.299 (citations omitted).
67. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12
(1979) (finding that the structure and language of the Nebraska parole statute created a
"legitimate expectation of release absent the requisite finding that one of the justifications for
deferral exists"). But see Merrill, supra note 64, at 964 (suggesting that the positive liberty
interests recognized by the Court-"new" liberty interests-should be distinguished from "new"
property rights). As Professor Merrill explains:
Positive liberty interests typically involve freedoms from restraint or punishment
that the state is otherwise free to inflict .... [N]ew" liberty interests typically do
not have a readily ascertainable monetary value, so the fact that the entitlement has
a monetary value would appear to provide a reasonable basis for differentiating
Roth-type property from new liberty interests.
Id. at 964-65.
68. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 61 n.13 (1999) (refusing to
address the issue of whether there was a property interest in claims for payment under a state-
regulated workers compensation act, as distinct from payment itself, because the respondents
did not claim such an interest); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926,942 (1986) (stating that the Court
has never held that procedural due process protects applicants for benefits); Walters v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985) (failing to reach the question
regarding whether there is a property right in an application for federal veterans' benefits that
implicates the Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment); Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 470
U.S. 1018, 1021 (1985) (mem.) (order denying certiorari) (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (asserting
that the Court has never determined whether applicants for general assistance have a protected
property interest).
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II. Substantive Due Process and Liberty
In 1964, Professor Charles Reich introduced to the legal world the concept
of The New Property.69 In this groundbreaking article, Reich articulated the
unique nature of the modem administrative state and the various benefits that it
doles out from its "largess. 70 Reich identified various concerns that led him to
suggest that courts should attach a property-like right to certain governmental
benefits. 7' Two of these concerns are particularly relevant to our discussion:
First, governmental power expands when the government decides to extend or
offer a benefit.72  Second, this power is magnified by an administrative
agency's discretion in how to interpret its own authority and make policy.
73
Reich's solution to these two concerns was to give the individual a property
right in at least part of the largess she receives from the government, so that the
individual may have some protection from an unjust revocation of her benefits,
thus protecting her self-sufficiency. 74 However, this solution is short-sighted.
While Reich asserts a property interest in things such as welfare benefits and
social security7 because a person's status depends on these benefits, 76 he
neglects to consider the problem of benefits that may not be entirely essential to
69. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
70. See id. at 733-36 (describing the numerous and various types of benefits that the
modem administrative state offers, from jobs to occupational licenses, and from governmental
contracts to subsidies).
71. See id. at 785 (suggesting that a property interest should attach when largess is linked
to personal status). As Reich proposes, "[Florms of largess which are closely linked to status
must be deemed to be held as of right. Like property, such largess could be governed by a
system of regulation plus civil or criminal sanctions, rather than a system based upon denial,
suspension and revocation." Id.
72. See id. at 746 (stating that distribution of government largess expands the
government's power). Specifically, Reich noted that "[w]hen government-national, state or
local-hands out something of value, whether a relief check or a television license,
government's power grows forthwith; it automatically gains such power as is necessary and
proper to supervise its largess. It obtains new rights to investigate, to regulate, and to punish."
Id.
73. See id. at 749-51 (finding that the nature of administrative governance-in allowing
an agency to interpret its own power, to hold multiple functions, and to administer sanctions,
coupled with individual actors unable or unwilling to resist agency manipulation-increases
governmental power over the individual).
74. See id. at 785-86 (suggesting that government benefits linked to status should be
treated as property to reinforce a person's dignity and self-sufficiency).
75. See id. at 785 ("The concept of right is most urgently needed with respect to benefits
like unemployment compensation, public assistance, and old age insurance.").
76. See id. ("[S]tatus deriv[es] primarily from source of livelihood.").
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status, but are nonetheless important in the sense that the grant of these benefits
expands the government's powers over the individual. 7
In thinking about the enlargement of government power via the offering of
various benefits, when granting or denying a benefit not recognized as a
property right,78 the decisionmaker needs to observe only those procedures
mandated by the corresponding state statute. 79  Applications for benefits
granted or denied at the sole discretion of an agency's decisionmaking official,
with little or no statutory guidance as to how to make the determination, do not
implicate due process protections. 80 The high level of discretion that an official
has in extending a benefit necessarily precludes any claim that the applicant
had a legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefit under the current property
regime.8" So, where does this leave the minority applicant for a state
scholarship, applying for a scholarship awarded by a state's department of
education on the basis of undefined "merit" and minority status? Where does
this leave the applicant for the state small business loan program, where the
basis for the determination is ill-defined "need"? These current victims of the
property paradigm for government benefits may suffer potentially arbitrary
governmental actions because procedural due process challenges do not exist.
One way to solve the under-inclusiveness of the current property paradigm
is to view an applicant's interest not as a property interest (regardless of any
77. See id. at 746-51 (concluding that by extending benefits, the government
automatically expands its power and stating that this power is magnified by an agency's wide
degree of discretion in determining its own policies and interpreting its own power).
78. By property right, I mean one found either under Reich's status-benefit theory or the
current federal circuit court evaluation of legitimate claims of entitlement.
79. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 449 (discussing the problem of denying an applicant
a license without adequate procedural protections). As Van Alstyne states:
To be sure, in some of these situations the government may itself be sufficiently
concerned about the risk of error to provide for appellate procedures less prone to
error. In such cases the adversely affected party may take advantage of those
additional procedures or, failing that, sue to secure specific compliance with
whatever procedures the agency has itself seen fit to provide. But that, by
definition, is to say only that government may be held to do what it undertakes to
do, leaving government free to reconsider the matter and free to arrange to do less
thereafter.
Id.
80. See supra note 17 (discussing how the level of discretion that a decisionmaker has
often determines whether or not a property interest exists).
81. This idea logically follows from the notion that when the decisionmaking official has
limited discretion, applications for benefits create a legitimate claim of entitlement, a property
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See supra note 17 and accompanying text
(discussing how the level of discretion that a decisionmaker has often determines whether or not
a property interest exists).
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potentially legitimate claim of entitlement), but as a liberty interest.82 Under
this theory, substantive due process protects a liberty interest defined as
"freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures. '83 This theory is not without
merit, as the Supreme Court has already held that substantive due process
protects persons from conscience-shocking actions. 84  In this sense, a
government official could not exercise his discretionary authority by throwing
darts at a wall to determine who will receive a coveted government benefit.8 5
In addition, in locating such a liberty interest, a court would not be confined to
searching state law for that interest.8 Rather, in order to respect the substantive
82. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 487 (suggesting that "freedom from arbitrary
adjudicative procedures" is a substantive element of liberty); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski
Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 624 (1997) (citing Van AIstyne's liberty
interest theory with approval and stating that "[a]rbitrary or irrational conduct by government
officers constitutes a substantive constitutional wrong, regardless of the adequacy or inadequacy
of the procedures surrounding the action").
83. Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 487. In other words: "[T]he ideas of liberty and of
substantive due process may easily accommodate a view that government may not adjudicate the
claims of individuals by unreliable means." Id.
84. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998) ("[fln a due
process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the behavior of the
governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the
contemporary conscience."). The Court went on to explain that at the core of the meaning of
due process was protection from arbitrary action:
The principal and true meaning of [due process] has never been more tersely or
accurately stated than by Mr. Justice Johnson, in Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4
Wheat. 235-244 [(1819)] ... : "As to the words from Magna Carta, incorporated
into the Constitution of Maryland, after volumes spoken and written with a view to
their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at last settled down to this: that
they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right
and distributive justice."
We have emphasized time and again that "the touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government"
whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness... or in the
exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate
governmental objective ....
Id. at 845-46 (some citations omitted).
85. Under Van Alstyne's analysis, throwing darts to determine who receives the benefit
would be arbitrary. The adjudicative procedure is clearly unreliable, even if the sole
qualification to apply for a limited benefit, such as a scholarship, is "merit." The official has a
duty to at least review all applications, in order that an applicant's merit might be evaluated in
comparison to the other applicants.
86. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983) ("Liberty interests protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources-the Due Process Clause itself and the laws
of the States."), overruled in part by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Though the Court
stepped away from the extent of liberty interests created by prison regulations in Sandin v.
Connor, 515 U.S. at 477-88, it remains true today that liberty interests can be created out of
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due process liberty interest, the state would be responsible for defining the
method of accepting or denying applicants and giving the official more
guidance on how to make such determinations by more clearly defining factors
that clarify the meaning of the selection criteria.8 7 In this manner, the process
owed to the minority scholarship applicant might be a letter of receipt of the
application and short explanation of the reasons for denial of the application,
coupled with a procedure to petition for reconsideration."
With this minimum process, the applicant would be able to determine if
the review board correctly determined the sole nondiscretionary factor-the fact
of her minority status-and at a minimum, the applicant would know that
someone had reviewed her application.89 If the letter indicated that the
determination of her minority status was incorrect, then the procedure would
serve its purpose by exposing agency error and allowing the applicant to
challenge that error.90 No further process would be due or practical because of
state law or the Due Process Clause. But cf Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)
(finding that state law, not the Constitution, creates property interests).
87. As an alternative to developing better selection criteria, the state could require that all
decisions be rational.
88. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 489 ("It is perfectly familiar learning that when due
process applies, its particular dimensions are nevertheless the function of many contextual
considerations.").
89. See id. at 487 ("[The ideas of liberty and of substantive due process may easily
accommodate a view that government may not adjudicate the claims of individuals by unreliable
means."); see also Martha 1. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. REv. 297, 330 (1982) (advocating a constitutional right to know why administrative
decisions are made). As Professor Morgan states:
[T]he absence of prescribed criteria to guide administrative decisionmaking does
not eliminate the need for reasons requirements in order to protect against
erroneous decisions. Indeed,... the need for a statement of reasons may be
greatest where [a person] is "not even afforded the protection of written standards
to govern the exercise of the powers of the Board of Pardons."
Id. (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 472 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)). Professor Morgan argues that people subject to administrative decisions, such as
decisions made by a parole board, should at a minimum receive a statement of reasons for the
denial of parole and a list of the facts relied upon for the decision. Id. at 332. However, in the
context of a scholarship applicant, a shorter statement should suffice. After all, as Justice
Harlan stated in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), "[Liberty] is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints." Therefore, any remedial procedures due for a
substantive due process violation of that liberty should enjoy similar flexibility. Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). As the interest of a scholarship applicant is minimal as
compared with that of a prisoner, though a statement may be due, it would be much more
limited than Professor Morgan's suggestions.
90. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 487 (finding that the ideas of liberty and substantive
due process should not allow the government to make determinations by unreliable means).
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the significant discretion involved.91 For instance, providing a list of specific
reasons for each candidate's failure to obtain the scholarship would be
administratively burdensome on the agency, which may be operating under
decisional and time constraints.92 In addition, due to the discretionary nature of
the determination, subjective reasons might be hard to articulate.93 In the sense
that the ultimate issuance of the benefit rests on these subjective factors, such
decisions may seem arbitrary. However, by issuing letters of receipt and
general statements of reasons for denials, the agency's minimum procedures
provide some evidence that it has considered all applications.
Critics of the theory that liberty includes within its meaning freedom from
arbitrary adjudicatory procedures state that "there would be no need to mention
any protected substantive interests if the clauses intended to establish a right to
due process without regard to the substantive interest at stake. 94  This
argument has a certain measure of logical force, but when one considers the
alternative-that there is no general right to be free from arbitrary adjudicatory
procedures-it seems a counterintuitive assumption.95  After all, if the
"touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary
91. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (finding three factors relevant
when determining the "specific dictates" of due process). The Mathews Court identified the
factors a court must consider:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Id. at 335; see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990) (concluding that in
determining whether due process requirements are sufficient, the court must "examine the
procedural safeguards built into the statutory or administrative procedure of effecting the
deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law");
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (stating that due process is "flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands").
92. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (finding fiscal and administrative burdens relevant
considerations when determining whether additional procedures are necessary).
93. See Morgan, supra note 89, at 322 ("In the context of reasons requirements, the
Court's focus on positive law definitions of protected interest has led it to reject arguments for
imposing reasons requirements on 'discretionary' decisionmaking because of the absence of
prescribed criteria establishing an 'entitlement' to a particular result.").
94. Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 18 (1983).
95. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 487-88 (finding that the freedom to be free from
"arbitrary adjudicatory procedures" is in accord with "highly conventional social contract
theories that yield the background of the Constitution").
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action of the government, '9 6 then a person should at least be able to expect a
minimum level of rationality from her government when she interacts with it,
regardless of the benefit at issue or the discretion of the decisionmaker.97
The plausibility of attacking adverse benefit applications decisions under such
a liberty approach is not clear. Research reveals only one case where an applicant
has challenged a denial of an application for benefits under the theory that the
agency abridged the applicant's right to be free from arbitrary adjudicatory
procedures. 8 However, in other contexts, arguments asserting this substantive
liberty right have had varying degrees of success.99 For the most part, courts
96. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding that substantive due process includes "freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints and... also recognizes,
what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment" (citations omitted)).
97. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S 199,232(1974) ("No matter how rational or consistent
with congressional intent a particular decision might be, the determination of eligibility cannot
be made on an ad hoc basis by the dispenser of the funds."); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d
705, 715 (2d Cir. 1968) (explaining that arbitrary agency action "cannot be reconciled with the
fundamental principle that ours is a government of laws, not men"); McDonough v. Goodcell,
91 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Cal. 1939) ("[D]iscretion must be exercised within legal bounds. Those
bounds are generally that the discretion of the administrative officer or board may not be
exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, fraudulently, or without factual basis sufficient to justify the
refusal."); State v. Wheelock, 45 A.2d 430,432-33 (Vt. 1946) ("[D]iscretion as to the granting
of licenses may lawfully be delegated to public officials without prescribing definite rules of
action, but not, however, to be exercised arbitrarily, for that would not be discretion."); see also
Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 487 (noting that case law suggests that one's personal freedom
includes the protection to be free from a government's arbitrary decisionmaking). Van Alstyne
states that "[s]uch a liberty may be at least as old as the idea of the social contract, which
informs so much of our Constitution." Id.
98. See Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 535-36 (Cal. 1985) (finding a statutorily
created right to apply for a compensation benefit from the state bar association and finding that
this right triggers procedural due process protections). Specifically, the court stated:
As we have described, petitioner does not have a right to an award from the [Client
Security Fund (CSF)]. The bar is free to exercise its discretion and to set any
guidelines it sees fit which advance the legislative policy behind the CSF.
Nonetheless, an applicant may be entitled to relief "if the announced grounds for
[the bar's decision have] been patently arbitrary or discriminatory."
Id. at 536 (quoting People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 629 (Cal. 1979)). Because the California
court fixed the focus of due process claims on the freedom to be free from procedural grossness,
the procedure of decisionmaking itself, it suggests that statutory benefit schemes, even if highly
discretionary, must still provide procedural protections. Id. at 534.
99. Compare Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626-27 (recognizing that the freedom to be free from
procedural grossness protects "dignitary values") with Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,250
(1983) (finding unpersuasive a claim of liberty interest in procedure).
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generally have rejected the notion of the existence of a liberty interest as
unpersuasive.'0o
A. People v. Ramirez
One court that has not rejected such an interest is the California Supreme
Court.'O' Thus, it would be prudent to examine this court's reasoning to determine
why it identified such a liberty interest and the procedural protections that the liberty
interest yielded. In People v. Ramirez,'02 the California Supreme Court confronted
the meaning of the state's due process clause.'0 3 To guide its opinion of the scope
of California's due process clause, the court reviewed United States Supreme Court
precedent regarding the federal Due Process Clause.' 4
In Ramirez, a state court had convicted the appellant of second degree burglary
in 1970, and he pleaded guilty to possession of heroin in 1971.105 After adjourning
100. See, e.g., Olim, 461 U.S. at 250 (finding unpersuasive a claim of liberty interest in
procedure); United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding unpersuasive a
claim of property interest in procedure); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (6th Cir.
1980) (finding that procedural rules created by administrative bodies do not create a liberty
interest recognized by the federal constitution); Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F.2d 916, 924-25 (2d
Cir. 1980) (finding that a policy statement did not affect the U.S. Attorney General's discretion
to grant or deny a benefit); Cofone v. Manson, 594 F.2d 934, 938 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Although a
Due Process Clause liberty interest may be grounded in state law that places substantive limits
on the authority of state officials, no comparable entitlement can derive from a statute that
merely establishes procedural requirements."); Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F.2d 13, 16 (lst Cir.
1977) ("We do not regard it as inconceivable that substantive protections could be inferred from
the existence of procedural safeguards but where, as here, the practice is that there are no
limitations on the administrator's discretion in these matters, we see no basis for doing so.").
101. See Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626-27 (finding that substantive liberty includes the right to
be free from arbitrary adjudicatory procedures). A subsequent case, Schultz v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 160 Cal. App. 3d 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), attempted to limit the scope of Ramirez.
Specifically, Schultz stated that Ramirez should be limited to the "arena of deprivation of
statutory interests." !d. at 786. However, the context of Schultz, a case where an employee
sought a hearing on a mere reclassification of his position and not a demotion or an application
for a different position, id. at 773-74, distinguishes it from application for benefit cases. In
addition, given the holding in Saleeby, 702 P.2d at 535-36, which found a statutorily created
right to apply for compensation benefits from state bar association triggered procedural due
process protections, it is unclear how such a limitation, imposed by a single state appellate
court, would affect the holding of Ramirez. For a discussion of Saleeby, see infra part III.B.
102. People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622 (Cal. 1979).
103. See id. at 624 ("In this case we review the scope of the due process clauses of the
California Constitution.").
104. See id. at 625 ("We begin our analysis by examining United States Supreme Court
decisions discussing the federal due process clause.").
105. Id. at 624.
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criminal proceedings in each case, the state court determined that the appellant was,
or was in danger of becoming, a narcotic addict. 0 6 The court committed him to the
California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) for treatment.'0 7 After four years, he
obtained outpatient status.' Two years later, the police arrested appellant for
resisting arrest and disturbing the peace.' 09 The director ofcorrections subsequently
found that appellant "was 'not a fit subject for confinement or treatment' in the
CRC."" 0 The superior court held a hearing on the "propriety ofthe order excluding
appellant from the CRC" and found that the Director did not abuse his discretion in
making his determination."' The superior court then terminated the appellant's
CRC commitment and criminal proceedings against him resumed." 2 On appeal,
appellant claimed that the procedures used by the CRC to exclude him from their
program denied him his right to procedural due process under the California
constitution."
3
The California Supreme Court began its evaluation of the appellant's claim by
evaluating Supreme Court case law regarding the federal Due Process Clause.
114
The court found that under federal law, liberty interests, like property interests,
derive from the federal Constitution or state law.' The court examined Supreme
Court precedent and found that "[w]hen the asserted interest is derived exclusively
from state law, it will be recognized as within the scope of due process liberty if the
state statute protects the interest by permitting its forfeiture only on the happening of
specified conditions."' 1 6 Conversely, it noted that a statute not containing specific
conditions for revocation of a benefit will yield no due process protection under
Supreme Court precedent. 7 Finding that the vague statutory language limited the








113. Id. at 625.
114. See id. ("We begin our analysis by examining United States Supreme Court decisions
discussing the federal due process clause.").
115. See id. ("In interpreting the federal clause, the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner
may derive a due process liberty interest from either the Constitution or state law.").
116. Id.
117. See id. ("By contrast, in cases in which a statute does not protect an interest by
specifying that its loss is subject to the happening of some condition, a protected liberty interest
is not created under federal law.").
118. See id. (stating that the CRC director must decide whether the person is not a fit
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remaining in the CRC was a liberty interest protected by federal due process
that warranted some degree of procedural protection." 9
However, the court boldly expanded its finding, accepting the conclusion
that the situation warranted procedural protection under Supreme Court case
law, but finding the Supreme Court's analysis unsatisfactory. 20 Specifically,
the California court pointed to the effect of the Supreme Court's reasoning:
[A]s long as the interest is not one that would otherwise fall within the
scope of constitutional concepts of liberty, the state may "define it out" of
the due process clause by specifying that it is subject to the unconditional
discretion of the person in charge of its administration; further the state may
apparently limit the scope of the clause in this manner irrespective of the
extent to which "grievous loss" or "substantial adverse impact" results.' 2 '
Citing Van Alstyne, among other scholars, the court noted that the Supreme
Court's reasoning leaves a state free to determine what procedures to follow
when it deals with its citizens.' The court then found that the current federal
Due Process Clause analysis ignores fundamental values found at the root of
the Due Process Clause:
23
Initially, the approach fails to give sufficient weight to the important due
process value of promoting accuracy and reasonable predictability in
governmental decision making when individuals are subject to deprivatory
action. The Supreme Court itself has stated that "[tlhe touchstone of due
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government." And, as one federal circuit court observed with respect to
subject for confinement or treatment before he excludes a person from the program, considering
excessive criminality or other relevant reasons to make his determination).
119. See id. ("[S]ince exclusion is conditioned by the terms of the statute, the patient-
inmate's interest in remaining in the CRC is apparently within the scope of due process liberty
and therefore war'rants some degree of procedural protection.").
120. See id. at 626 ("Although we agree with [the Supreme Court's] conclusion, the
reasoning appears anomalous.").
121. Id. But see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)
("'Property' cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can
life or liberty."). As the Loudermill Court explained:
The right to due process "is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional
guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in
[public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such
an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards."
Id. (citations omitted).
122. See People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626 (Cal. 1979). But cf Loudermill, 470 U.S.
at 541 (finding that a state cannot create a right and then limit it by the quantity and quality of
the procedural protections it provides for that right).
123. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626.
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occupations controlled by government, "The public has the right to expect
its officers ... to make adjudications on the basis of merit. The first step
toward insuring that these expectations are realized is to require adherence
to the standards of due process; absolute and uncontrolled discretion invites
abuse."
124
The California court noted that in order to counteract such abuse, a
reviewing court must focus on procedural protections that create reliable results,
rather than initially focusing on whether the state grants or denies the benefit on
the basis of certain specified criteria.'25 Explaining further difficulties with the
federal approach, such as failing to recognize the dignity and worth of the
individual, the court decided to break with Supreme Court interpretations of the
Due Process Clause and held that an individual's statutory interests must always
be evaluated within the context of the principle that substantive liberty includes
the right to be free from arbitrary adjudicatory procedures.
126
Finding a substantive liberty interest that triggers procedural due process
protections, the court then proceeded to address how it would determine the
procedures necessary to honor the Due Process Clause. 27 As Van Alstyne
predicted, finding a liberty interest in substantive due process triggered procedural
protections as a remedy for a violation of the interest. 28 Observing that due
process is a flexible notion, the court determined that the process due will always
turn on the balancing of the interests at stake in any given situation.
129
The court offered four factors to guide a court in determining the amount of
due process required: (1) the private interest affected by governmental action;
(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation by the procedures used and the value of
additional or alternative procedural safeguards; (3) the "dignitary interest in
informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action"; and
(4) the governmental interest, including financial considerations and additional
burdens imposed by alternative or additional procedural requirements.' 30 In the
124. Id. (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974), and Hornsby v. Allen,
326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964)) (internal citations omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 626-27.
127. See id. (discussing the federal approach in determining the necessary procedures to
honor the Due Process Clause and discussing further factors necessary to evaluate in
determining the proper procedures under the California due process clause).
128. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 488-89 (discussing substantive liberty interests and
concluding that finding such an interest, the freedom to be free from arbitrary adjudicatory
procedures, will trigger some procedural protections).
129. People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626-27 (Cal. 1979).
130. Id. at 627-28. These considerations closely resemble those set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (finding three factors relevant when determining the
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appellant's case, the procedure required for appellant's exclusion from the CRC
included an opportunity to respond to the various grounds for his exclusion prior
to any final decision, a statement of the grounds for exclusion, and access to any
information the director used in making his decision.' In addition, the court
required the CRC to notify a patient of his right to respond, a right that contained
an actual opportunity to respond orally to the appropriate official.3 2 Finally, the
court found that the patient should receive a statement of the final decision that
includes the reasons for that decision.
33
Following the logic thoughtfully set forth in Ramirez, one can extract two
general principles that apply to applicants and recipients alike. First, inquiry into
the denial or deprivation of a benefit should not start with an evaluation of the
liberty or property interest involved. 34 Rather, substantive due process requires
an agency to operate in a rational manner that honors an individual's liberty
interest in freedom from arbitrary adjudicatory procedures. 35 Starting with this
assumption allows a court to avoid the property inquiry currently used in benefit
application due process claims because the focus shifts toward the government's
rationality in its decisionmaking process. 36 Second, the court recognized that due
process helps to minimize abuses of government discretion and, thus, requires
some procedural protection in order to secure accurate and reliable administrative
decisions. 37 Specifically, the California Supreme Court makes no mention of
"specific dictates" of due process); see supra note 91 (discussing the Mathews factors).
However, the California court adds a concern for an individual's dignity that is missing from the
Mathews approach. Ramirez, 599 F.2d at 626-27.
131. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 631.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 632.
134. As the court states:
[W]hen a person is deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit, due process must
start not with a judicial attempt to decide whether the statute has created an
'entitlement' that can be defined as 'liberty' or 'property,' but with an assessment
of what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of the
governmental and private interests at stake.
Id. at 632.
135. See id. at 626-27 (discussing the liberty interest and the ability of procedure, even if it
does not alter the outcome of the action, to create the appearance of fairness).
136. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 485-90 (discussing the difficulties in identifying
government benefits as property and proposing to solve these difficulties by finding a
substantive liberty interest that would focus on the fairness of adjudicative procedures,
regardless of whether one considered a benefit to be property).
137. See People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626 (Cal. 1979) ("[C]ourts must evaluate the
extent to which procedural protections can be tailored to promote more accurate and reliable
administrative decisions in light of the governmental and private interests at stake.").
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establishing any liberty or property interest before requiring minimal procedures
to ensure accuracy. Rather, it is the presence of a benefit or deprivation, perhaps
too small or insignificant to be deemed property or liberty, plus a substantive due
process right to nonarbitrary treatment, that triggers this protection.
3 1
B. Saleeby v. State Bar
Six years after the California Supreme Court located a right to be free from
procedural grossness in the California constitution's due process clause, the
California Supreme Court extended Ramirez to applications for benefits. In
Saleeby v. State Bar,'39 the California Supreme Court held that procedural due
process must attach to applications for state bar compensation benefits to ensure
the nonarbitrary exercise of discretion by state bar decisionmakers. 140  The
plaintiff applied for benefits under a state program designed to compensate
litigants that were victims of attorney misconduct. 14  The bar denied the
plaintiff's initial application, explaining that the reviewing panel was divided and
invited the plaintiff to request reconsideration. 142  The plaintiff requested
reconsideration, and the bar subsequently awarded plaintiff $10,246, which was
substantially less than the sum that plaintiff requested in his initial application.1
43
The plaintiff then appealed the decision in the courts.
4 4
The petitioner challenged the bar's unreviewable discretion in determining
awards. 1 4  After looking at the statutory language and purpose, the California
Supreme Court "conclude[d] that the Legislature did not intend the bar's powers
to be limitless and that the bar's exercise of discretion [was] reviewable to assure
conformance to the purposes of the fund and to avoid the potential for arbitrary or
discriminatory decisions."146 Focusing on its earlier holding in Ramirez, the court
138. See id. (finding that the court should look to the nature of the private and
governmental interests at stake when determining what procedures will produce reliable
decisions).
139. Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525 (Cal. 1985).
140. See Saleeby, 702 P.2d at 535-36 (finding a statutory right to apply for compensation
benefits from state bar association that triggers procedural due process).
141. Id. at 527.
142. Id. at 528.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 533.
146. Id.
909
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 883 (2004)
determined that the plaintiff had a right to have his application for benefits
reviewed and decided in a nonarbitrary fashion. 147 Specifically, the court stated:
As we have described, petitioner does not have a right to an award from the
CSF. The bar is free to exercise its discretion and to set any guidelines it sees
fit which advance the legislative policy behind the CSF. Nonetheless, an
applicant may be entitled to relief "if the announced grotl for [the bar's
decision have] been patently arbitrary or discriminatory."
The court went on to require the state bar to set forth guidelines for itself that
honor procedural protections and create a reviewable record.
1 49
C. Summary
Ramirez and Saleeby emphasize the importance of locating a liberty interest
within substantive due process. Although other courts have failed to follow the
reasoning in Ramirez and Saleeby, "0 and the United States Supreme Court seems
to have rejected a claim that specific process protections outlined in a statute do
not themselves create an independent liberty interest to be free from procedural
grossness,' this fact should not necessarily dissuade an applicant who is
arbitrarily denied benefits from claiming that an agency abridged his substantive
147. See id. at 535 ("Following the approach of Ramirez, we inquire whether the present
procedures adequately assure that the bar, having elected to exercise the discretion conferred
upon it by the Legislature, will exercise that discretion in a nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory
fashion.").
148. Id. at 536 (quoting People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 627 (Cal. 1979)) (alteration in
original).
149. See id. at 536-37 (discussing the difficulties with the procedures in place at the time
of the suit and stating, "We therefore find it appropriate to order the bar to reformulate its
regulations pursuant to its authority under Business and Professions Code section 6140.5 ... ").
150. A Westlaw search of the case citing references for Ramirez and Saleeby has not
revealed that other courts have depended on these cases for their reasoning in determining what
due process an application for benefits deserves.
151. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983) (finding claim of liberty interest
in procedure unpersuasive). Justice Blackmun explained:
[A] liberty interest is of course a substantive interest of an individual; it cannot be
the right to demand needless formality.. . . Its constitutional purpose is to protect
a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.
If officials may transfer a prisoner for whatever reason or for no reason at all, there
is no such interest for process to protect. The State may choose to require
procedures for reasons other than protection against deprivation of substantive
rights, of course, but in making that choice the State does not create an independent
substantive right.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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freedom to be free from procedural grossness. 15 2 The California Supreme Court
makes a persuasive argument that freedom from procedural grossness should be a
recognized liberty interest protected by due process, regardless of whether an
agency has little or broad discretion.'53 In addition, United States Supreme Court
precedent suggests that the Court may recognize important dignitary interests,
thus making the claim for a substantive liberty interest to be free from procedural
grossness more plausible.'54 If the United States Supreme Court chooses not to
follow the lead of the California court, it will, in essence, legitimize an agency's
right to make discretionary decisions in an unfair and prejudiced manner, free
from constitutional constraints.155
152. See id. at 257-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding that the guiding factors that assist
a committee in making its discretionary recommendations for transfers and classifications of
prisoners created a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause). Justice Marshall's
logic closely resembles that found in Saleeby, in that the court in Saleeby evaluated statutory
language and purpose to determine that the discretion of the decisionmaker was not unfettered.
See Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 533-35 (Cal. 1985) (discussing the requirements of the
statute and concluding that the procedures of the bar must promote the nonarbitrary,
nondiscriminatory exercise of its discretion).
153. See People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626-27 (Cal. 1979) (discussing flaws in the
Supreme Court's reasoning and the benefits of recognizing a right to be free from arbitrary
adjudicative procedures).
154. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (finding that the Due Process
Clause recognizes dignitary interests). Specifically, the Jerrico Court stated:
The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal
in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative
proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process, the
prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of
participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmakingprocess.
The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not
be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law.
At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness,
"generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been
done," by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of
a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not
predisposed to find against him.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphases added); see also Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I think it clear that even the inmate retains an unalienable interest in
liberty-at the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity-which the Constitution may
never ignore."). Though the Jerrico Court spoke in the context of administrative prosecutors
and judges, and Justice Stevens spoke in the context of prisoners, the root of their assertions-
that persons should be treated with dignity-rings true.
155. See Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 627 (stating that the finding that freedom from arbitrary
adjudicative procedures is a substantive element of one's liberty presumes that a person will
have a liberty interest in fair and unprejudiced decisionmaking). Thus, no interest in fair and
unprejudiced decisionmaking follows if a court fails to acknowledge such a substantive liberty
interest.
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IV. Equal Protection
Given the paucity of case law supporting a person's freedom to be free from
procedural grossness, it is worth shifting the focus away from due process
concerns-procedural and substantive-to another challenge that may protect an
applicant from arbitrary decisions. 56 Challenging an arbitrary decision on equal
protection grounds eliminates the threshold need to locate a liberty or property
interest in order to bring a claim.'s 7 Van Alstyne states that it is impractical to
rely on equal protection because, in the case of an applicant, "we are... dealing
with situations in which all similarly situated persons are uniformly subject to the
same degree of procedural grossness."'15 8 It would seem obvious that, to the
extent that a decisionmaker treats all applicants in an arbitrary fashion, it is
unlikely that courts would find an equal protection violation. 1'5 9 It is also possible
that the political process will function as an adequate remedy for widespread
arbitrary action by government decisionmakers 60 To the extent that the federal
courts have attempted to solve this issue under the property interest paradigm,
156. This Part only addresses the merits of an equal protection claim for arbitrarily denied
applications for benefits. It does not seek further investigation into subjects such as standing.
However, it is important to note that at least in the affirmative action context, applicants for
benefits do have standing. See N.E. Fla. Chapter of Assoc'd Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (finding that when the government erects a barrier that
makes it more difficult for one group to obtain a benefit, those members challenging the barrier
need not prove that but for the barrier, the challenger would have received the benefit to achieve
standing). As the Court stated, "The 'injury in fact' in an equal protection case of this variety is
the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate
inability to obtain the benefit." Id.; see also Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 708
(9th Cir. 1997) (challenging a statute that allowed a contracting company owned by women or
minorities "to subcontract out a fifth of the work to whomever it [chose][], or keep the work
itself, but denie[d] this flexibility to contractors not in those groups"). The Ninth Circuit found
that bidders "need only show that they are forced to compete on an unequal basis" and that
being forced to compete on an unequal basis because of race (or sex) is an injury under the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 708. Though it is clear that race-based policies receive strict
scrutiny, an applicant for a benefit would presumably have standing if the discretion of the
official created a class of people treated differently from other applicants and if the creation of
that class had no rational basis.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating that due process applies when life, liberty, or
property is at stake, but making no such qualification for equal protection claims).
158. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 451.
159. See id. (stating that in such a case, all individuals would be treated equally unfairly).
160. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) ("Whether styled as a
constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where
large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process,
may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance."). The flaw in this




applicants for benefits defined by strict eligibility criteria already possess
legitimate claims of entitlement protected by procedural due process. 16' Thus, the
more likely scenario in which one may find a violation of equal protection, but
not necessarily a denial of due process, arises when a decisionmaker with a high
level of discretion fails to consider certain applications at all.
A. Bush v. Gore
Though contextually distinct, Bush v. Gore162 provides valuable insight into
how a benefit applicant may assert a claim that the state denied her equal
protection.1 One might initially try to distinguish Bush v. Gore from a case
involving an alleged violation of equal protection in determining the allocation of
a discretionary benefit. After all, the right to vote is often considered a
fundamental right deserving strict scrutiny in the equal protection context."
However, Professor Pamela S. Karlan suggests that the Court did not apply a
strict scrutiny review in Bush v. Gore.165  Removing Bush v. Gore from
161. See supra Part II (discussing the current property interest paradigm in determining
whether applicants for benefits receive procedural due process protections).
162. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). As most people remember, Bush v.
Gore stopped the manual recounts of votes for President of the United States in various counties
of the State of Florida. Id. at 110. First, the Court found that the Florida legislature had
conferred the right to vote for presidential electors on Florida's citizens. Id. at 104-05. Having
found this right, the Court noted that equal protection applies both to the initial allocation of the
vote and to the "manner of its exercise." Id. at 104. In evaluating the Florida Supreme Court's
order that the intent of the voter should be determined in recounts, the Court determined that the
measures taken by the county canvassing boards to observe the Florida Supreme Court's
decision did "not satisfy the minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters
necessary to secure the fundamental right." Id. at 105. As the Court stated, "The problem
inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application." Id. at 106. Thus,
the Court found that the lack of uniform standards designed to determine the intent of individual
voters in manual recounts violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 109.
163. See id. at 103-08 (finding an equal protection violation in the "standardless manual
recounts" of votes required by the Florida Supreme Court).
164. See id. at 104 ("When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its
people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental."); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that restrictions on the right
to vote may need to receive more "exacting judicial scrutiny," whereas other legislative actions
receive mere rationality review); see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection:
Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE VoTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME COURT
77, 95 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (stating that a fundamental right
normally triggers strict scrutiny).
165. See Karlan, supra note 164, at 95 ("[M]ost of [the Court's] analysis seems to rest not
on traditional strict scrutiny forms of analysis, but rather on a perception that Florida's scheme
was simply arbitrary and therefore ran afoul of garden-variety rationality review.").
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fundamental rights jurisprudence by viewing it as an unremarkable application of
rational basis review sheds some light on how an applicant might challenge an
arbitrary denial of her benefit application. 66 That is, whenever a decisionmaker
makes any determination, whether of voter intent or the merit of a scholarship
applicant, one would assume that given the Court's analysis in Bush v. Gore, the
demands of minimum rationality would limit the discretion of the
decisionmaker.1
67
Though the Court asserted that it limited its decision to the facts of the
case, 168 it is unclear if Bush v. Gore is viable as precedent for the simple principle
that people, applications, or votes in similar circumstances should be treated
similarly. 69 In essence, the Court found that the discretion given to local
canvassing boards to determine voter intent created unequal evaluation of
ballots. 70 Thus, one could argue that the discretion of an agency decisionmaker,
or decisionmakers, denies equal protection to the applicants because in the
166. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in
Constitutional Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J.
2087, 2122 (2002) (discussing the equal protection claim in Bush v. Gore and comparing it to
administrative law principles). Specifically, Professor Krotoszynski states:
To be sure, Bush v. Gore did present a credible claim of an equal protection
violation. This is precisely why Justices Souter and Breyer voted to sustain the
equal protection claim. Black letter administrative law principles prohibit agencies
from arbitrarily administering their duties. Accordingly, were a local canvassing
board to deploy a Ouija board to discern the intent of the voter, such action would
violate basic notions of... equal protection. To the extent that persons at different
counting tables in the same county employed inconsistent standards for analyzing
undervotes, a nontrivial equal protection.., objection existed.
Id. at 2121-22.
167. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106 (finding that evaluation of voter intent required
specific standards to ensure equal evaluation of each ballot). But see Krotoszynski, supra note
166, at 2129 (noting that the Justices provided notions of equal protection that contradicted their
previous decisions regarding the scope of equal protection). Specifically, in examining Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Scalia's equal protection notions,
Krotoszynski states that "in the absence of any discriminatory intent and given the generally
cabined discretion inherent in the intent-of-the-voter standard, Florida's election procedures, as
explicated by the state supreme court, should have been 'good enough for government work.'
Id.
168. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities.").
169. To date, the author has been unable to find any cases that would support this point of
view. However, it is worth mentioning that unless the Court intends to wink as it stands by its
decision that "elected" the President (along ideological lines), the Court should not, in good
conscience, back away from the underlying principles of equal protection stated in the case.
170. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106-09 (discussing the various methods that counties
used in determining the intent of the voter).
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absence of standards, certain applicants receive treatment different from what
similarly situated applicants receive. To be sure, one might not find this argument
entirely persuasive. 7' Nevertheless, it is an argument worth making, in order to
protect an applicant from arbitrary governmental action.
Even if Bush v. Gore does not establish a generic guarantee of protection
from arbitrary governmental actions, even when the government actor has wide
discretion, other equal protection arguments exist. For example, one can fall back
on an approach similar to Van Alstyne's substantive due process approach.
172
Though it is unclear whether a court would accept the argument that an applicant
has a liberty interest in the right to be free from arbitrary adjudicatory procedures
in the substantive due process context, 173 a court concerned with the democratic
process, such as the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, might accept a substantive
equal protection claim based on the freedom to be free from arbitrary state
action. 174 By recognizing this fundamental liberty interest, the evaluation of an
application for benefits would not be functionally different from the evaluation of
171. The Court specifically stated that Bush v. Gore should be limited to its facts. Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. In addition, the fundamental nature of the right at stake may prevent the
case from being extrapolated into nonelectoral cases.
172. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 487 (locating the substantive freedom to be free
from procedural grossness).
173. See supra Part Ill (discussing the possibility of locating a liberty interest, the freedom
to be free from procedural grossness, under substantive due process).
174. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) ("None are more conscious of the vital
limits on judicial authority than are the Members of this Court, and none stand more in
admiration of the Constitution's design to leave the selection of the President to the people,
through their legislatures, and to the political sphere."). But, the Court continued, "When
contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought
responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues thejudicial system has been forced
to confront." Id. Thus, the Court will involve itself in a state's legislative and political affairs to
resolve important constitutional issues. See id. at 104 ("[Olne source of [the right to vote's]
fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to
each voter." (emphasis added)). The Court's mention of the dignity owed each voter recalls the
voice of Professor Richard B. Saphire, who argued that dignity interests should help guide the
notion of fairness in due process. See Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values:
Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 119-
25 (1978). Saphire went on to argue that the primary purpose of structuring procedural
protections that respect dignitary interests was:
ensur[ing] that the method of interaction itself is fair in terms of what are perceived
as minimum standards of political accountability-of modes of interaction which
express a collective judgment that human beings are important in their own right,
and that they must be treated with understanding, respect, and even compassion.
Id. at 159.
One can argue that the Bush v. Gore Court, arguably concerned with the democratic
process, cannot be blind to the need to protect dignitary interests if, as Saphire argues, they
protect "minimum standards of political accountability." Id.
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a voter's intent on a ballot. 75  Equal protection would demand that specific
standards govern the discretion of the decisionmaker in order to ensure equal
individual evaluation of each application. 76 Thus, a decisionmaker would not be
allowed to throw away half of the applications for a benefit scheme merely to
reduce his workload. 1
77
B. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech
In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 178 the Court bolstered the viability of
an equal protection claim regarding the application for benefits.179 The Court
175. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-06 (finding that the discretion of county
canvassing boards to determine the intent of the voter must be guided by specific standards to
ensure equal evaluation of each ballot).
176. This sounds a lot like Van Alstyne's approach in the substantive due process realm,
attempting to cue procedural protections by locating a substantive liberty interest. However, in
the equal protection context, a court would not be concerned with evaluating or adding
procedures to ensure fair and accurate results. In a more limited sense, equal protection would
only ensure that a decisionmaker evaluates each application in a similar manner. Thus, it
ensures that each application is considered. Furthermore, any finding of an equal protection
violation would cue uniform standards and begin to curb unlimited discretion. See
Krotoszynski, supra note 166, at 2122 (discussing the equal protection claim in Bush v. Gore
and comparing it to administrative law principles). Professor Krotoszynski explains that using
inconsistent standards in evaluating ballots created a colorable equal protection claim, because
"[b]lack letter administrative law principles prohibit agencies from arbitrarily administering
their duties." Id.
177. See Morin, supra note 1 (discussing the plight of two clerical workers who shredded
thousands of INS documents, including applications for visas, in an attempt to eliminate a
backlog of paperwork sent to the agency). Though the two clerical workers face federal charges
due to the duties they owed to the INS, id., the article serves as a broader reminder of the
corner-cutting measures some administrative employees may take to reduce an unanticipated
amount of paperwork.
178. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam). In Village of
Willowbrook, a homeowner sued the Village of Willowbrook, Illinois because the Village
required a thirty-three-foot easement for connection of the water service to the plaintiff's
property, where other homeowners in the Village only had to provide a fifteen-foot easement for
water connection. Id. at 563. The plaintiff claimed that the demand for the longer easement was
arbitrary and motivated by bitterness from a previous lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs against the
Village. Id. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff presented a cognizable equal protection
claim, in that she alleged that she had been treated differently from similarly situated property
owners, that the Village's demand was "irrational and wholly arbitrary," and that the Village
eventually connected her property to the water supply via a fifteen-foot easement. Id. at 565.
The court found that these allegations alone, without considering the Village's subjective
motivation, formed a cognizable equal protection claim. Id.; cf. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook,
160 F.3d 386, 387-89 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding a valid equal protection claim for the plaintiff
under a theory of "subjective ill will"), aft'd, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
179. See Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 565 (upholding equal protection claim
APPLICATIONS FOR BENEFITS
reaffirmed the broad nature of an equal protection claim, stating that "[t]he
purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to
secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through duly constituted agents."'8 0  Though the
applicant failed to allege membership in a class, the Court affirmed that "class-
of-one" equal protection claims will lie "where the plaintiff alleges that she has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment."'' It is important to
note that the Court did not limit its application of equal protection to the
particular facts of this class-of-one case.182 In fact, Justice Breyer noted that the
Court's language could "transform many ordinary violations of city or state law
into violations of the Constitution." 's3 Thus, Justice Breyer attempted to limit
Village of Willowbrook to cases in which there is not only a violation of the
principles of equal protection, but also an additional factor such as "ill will.'
8 4
However, it is unclear whether Justice Breyer's concurrence would carry
significant weight with the entire Supreme Court or the lower federal courts if
brought by class of one to address plaintiff's claim that she has been treated arbitrarily and
differently from other similarly situated persons).
180. Id. at 564 (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445
(1923)).
181. Id.
182. See id. at 565 (stating that plaintiff's allegations, apart from an additional allegation of
"subjective ill will," are sufficient to assert an equal protection violation).
183. Id. at 565 (Breyer, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the broad nature of the per curiam
opinion and finding that an extra factor, such as "ill will," should be required in order to raise an
equal protection claim for ordinary city and state violations). Justice Breyer stated:
It might be thought that a rule that looks only to an intentional difference in
treatment and a lack of a rational basis for that different treatment would work such
a transformation. Zoning decisions, for example, will often, perhaps almost always,
treat one landowner differently from another, and one might claim that, when a
city's zoning authority takes an action that fails to conform to a city zoning
regulation, it lacks a "rational basis" for its action (at least if the regulation in
question is reasonably clear).
This case, however, does not directly raise the question whether the simple and
common instance of a faulty zoning decision would violate the Equal Protection
Clause. That is because the Court of Appeals found that in this case respondent
had alleged an extra factor as well-a factor that the Court of Appeals called
"vindictive action," "illegitimate animus," or "ill will."
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir.
1998), aff'd, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam)).
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an applicant for benefits challenged a state's action as a violation of equal
protection.
C. Vindictive-Action Equal Protection
Language in several Seventh Circuit cases suggests that Justice Breyer's
suggested limit on Village of Willowbrook may be persuasive. However, as
in Bush v. Gore, the Court could have easily limited Village of Willowbrook to
the facts of that case. 186 It is telling that the majority in Village of Willowbrook
did not reach the issue of subjective ill will."8 7 Given the nature of the
plaintiff's claim, the fact that the plaintiff brought an equal protection claim
under the Seventh Circuit's "subjective ill will" equal protection analysis
should have forced the Court to consider and address the issue.188 Instead, by
making no reference to how much discretion the Village had in determining the
size of an easement needed to hook up the plaintiff to the village's water
supply, the Court found an equal protection violation because the Village
requested a fifteen-foot easement from all other residents of the village, while
they requested a thirty-three-foot easement from Ms. Olech.8 9 Therefore,
Village of Willowbrook may stand for the proposition that a state official may
not treat similarly situated people differently for irrational or wholly arbitrary
reasons. 1
90
185. See Olech, 160 F.3d at 388 (requiring the additional factor of subjective ill will in
order to create a viable claim for an equal protection violation); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d
176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the plaintiff stated a valid equal protection claim by
asserting that spite motivated a mayor to force the plaintiff to incur substantial legal bills for
trumped-up charges). Butsee Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54,61 (2d Cir. 1985)
(finding no equal protection violation despite an allegation that the zoning board of appeals had
"killed" plaintiff's application as a favor to the mayor). In Yale Auto Parts, the Second Circuit
explained that the plaintiff's claim lacked the assertion that the board treated other applicants
differently. Id.
186. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) (limiting the decision to the
facts of the case at hand).
187. See Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (per curiam) (declining to
reach the theory that subjective ill will created an equal protection violation).
188. See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing the
fact that the plaintiff brought the equal protection claim under the theory set forth in Esmail v.
Macrane, 53 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1995), a theory that focuses on arbitrary and vindictive actions
of state actors), afl'd, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
189. See Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 565 (finding the allegations, apart from the
claim of subjective motivation, stated a valid equal protection claim).
190. See id. (noting the plaintiff's alleged different treatment from similarly situated
homeowners, that the demand for a longer easement was arbitrary, and that the Village
eventually requested that Ms. Olech provide a fifteen-foot easement). These brief facts alleged a
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Support for Justice Breyer's theory of the need to add a claim of
"subjective ill will" to a discretionary decision was derived from the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Olech v. Village of Willowbrook.'9' In Olech, Judge
Posner found that the plaintiff's claim arose under a theory the judge described
as "vindictive-action equal protection."'192 A vindictive-action equal protection
claim, as developed by Judge Posner in Esmail v. Macrane 93 and Olech,
sufficient claim according to the Court. Id.
191. See Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding an
equal protection violation when the plaintiff alleged disparate treatment was the result of
"illegitimate animus" towards plaintiff), affd on other grounds, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). In Olech,
plaintiffs desired to have their home connected to the municipal water supply. Id. at 387. The
Village insisted that plaintiffs provide a thirty-three foot easement, though the Village had only
required a fifteen-foot easement for other similarly situated homeowners. Id. Plaintiffs alleged
that the Village demanded a thirty-three foot easement due to "substantial ill will" towards
plaintiffs as a result of previous litigation between the two parties. Id. Judge Posner noted that
there was no general requirement of"orchestration" in vindictive equal protection cases. Id. at
388. Thus, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the case. Id. at 389. Specifically,
Judge Posner stated:
Of course we are troubled, as was the district judge, by the prospect of turning
every squabble over municipal services, of which there must be tens or even
hundreds of thousands every year, into a federal constitutional case. But bear in
mind that the "vindictive action" class of equal protection cases requires proof that
the cause of the differential treatment of which the plaintiff complains was a totally
illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant.
Id. at 388.
192. Id.
193. See Esmail, 53 F.3d at 179 (finding plaintiff alleged a valid equal protection claim by
stating that an equal protection claim may be brought if plaintiff alleges different treatment was
the result of a "vindictive campaign"). In Esmail, the plaintiff, a liquor store owner, claimed
the mayor of Naperville, Illinois engaged in a campaign of persecution against him that resulted
in the city moving to deny his license renewal application for his current liquor store and his
license application for a new liquor store. Id. at 177. The plaintiff claimed that the mayor,
motivated by animosity, trumped up charges against him to deny the license applications, and he
incurred $75,000 in legal expenses to get his licenses granted. Id. at 177-78. The court found
that while the equal protection claim was unusual and did not fit under the usual rubric of
traditional equal protection claims, a valid equal protection claim will lie where the unequal
treatment is a result of a "vindictive campaign." Id. at 178-79. As Judge Posner explained:
[E]qual protection does not just mean treating identically situated persons
identically.. .. That has been understood since Aristotle invented the antecedent
of our concept of equal protection more than two millennia ago. If the liquor
dealers enumerated in Esmail's complaint committed worse infractions than he was
charged with but were let off with lighter or no sanctions, this was unequal
treatment. It would not in itself establish a claim under the equal protection clause,
because nonactionable selective prosecution produces exactly such inequalities.
The distinctive feature here ... is that the unequal treatment is alleged to have been
the result solely of a vindictive campaign by the mayor.
Our decision in Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982), holds
that such conduct, so motivated, violates the equal protection clause . . . . The
919
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supports the notion that there are limits to official discretion, no matter how
wide that discretion may be.' 94 The standard announced by Judge Posner
applies to discretionary actions motivated by vindictiveness.' 9 Posner's theory
of equal protection may protect some applicants whose applications may be
discarded by decisionmakers who act on personal feelings about the applicant.
But, vindictiveness itself might be too narrow a limit to draw for arbitrary
decisionmaking. 196 In order to protect the individual as an applicant, one only
needs to expand upon Judge Posner's meaning of vindictiveness. For example,
instead of requiring those plaintiffs litigating equal protection claims to allege
unequal treatment and an element of vindictiveness on the part of the state
actor, a court could require a claim of "bad faith discretion" or "irrational
arbitrariness" which would encompass the vindictiveness standard. In this
manner, an applicant could challenge a denial of a completely discretionary
benefit via an equal protection claim in several ways: (1) that subjective ill will
motivated the decisionmaker to refuse the benefit to the applicant; 197 (2) that
subjective ill will motivated the decisionmaker to refuse to review the
principle it states is no doubt subject to abuse by persons whose real complaint is
selective prosecution in the sense that is not cognizable in suits to enforce the equal
protection clause. But it strikes us as sound. If the power of government is brought
to bear on a harmless individual merely because a powerful state or local official
harbors a malignant animosity toward him, the individual ought to have a remedy in
federal court.
Id. at 179.
194. See Esmail, 53 F.3d at 178-79 (stating that selective prosecution, though it may be
arbitrary in result, producing random disparities or enforcement targeted at "newsworthy
lawbreakers," can be limited by prohibiting discretion motivated by vindictiveness).
195. See Olech, 160 F.3d at 388 ("[T]he 'vindictive action' class of equal protection cases
requires proof that the cause of the differential treatment of which the plaintiff complains was a
totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant."); Esmail, 53 F.3d at 179 ("If
the power of government is brought to bear on a harmless individual merely because a powerful
state or local official harbors a malignant animosity toward him, the individual ought to have a
remedy in federal court.").
196. If a plaintiff who is not subjected to "subjective ill will" claims an equal protection
violation, she cannot allege vindictiveness and her equal protection claim may be trumped up to
something equivalent to selective prosecution-something that recognizes a lack of sufficient
resources or other reasonable motivation for reaching disparate results. See Esmail v. Macrane,
53 F.3d 176, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing the law's tolerance of unequal legal treatment
in the case of selective prosecution).
197. That is, if the benefit was a benefit usually granted to all applicants, an applicant could
challenge the denial of that benefit to her if the sole reason for plaintiffs denial was
vindictiveness. See id. at 177-78 (discussing plaintiff's denial of licenses for his liquor stores
and how the city's vindictively motivated denials led plaintiff to incur substantial legal fees that
spurred him to bring his claim that he had been denied equal protection).
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applicant's application;' 98 and (3) that the decisionmaker irrationally refused to
consider the applicant's application.199 By stating the additional requirement as
"irrational arbitrariness," it is important to note that the applicant would not be
challenging the final decision of whether or not to grant the plaintiff the
benefit.200 Rather, the plaintiff would merely be arguing that all applications
must be evaluated in the same manner-that any arbitrary decisions must occur
randomly, or if not randomly, for a rational reason. It may seem a fine
distinction to draw, but "irrational arbitrariness," rather than vindictiveness,
captures the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause. As Judge Posner has
observed, "[Equal protection] has long been understood to provide a kind of
last-ditch protection against governmental action wholly impossible to relate to
legitimate governmental objectives.
20 1
D. The "Newer" Equal Protection
In 1972, Professor Gerald Gunther provided a concise review of the cases
decided by the Supreme Court on equal protection grounds.0 2 According to
198. See id. (discussing denial of licenses for the plaintiffs liquor stores and how the city's
vindictively motivated denials led him to incur substantial legal fees that caused him to bring his
claim of denial of equal protection).
199. See id. at 179-80 ("[Slome objectives of state action simply are illegitimate and will
not support actions challenged as denials of equal protection."). This claim would be especially
useful when the claim is not subjective ill will towards a particular applicant, but rather unfair
favoritism of another applicant. An example of this mistreatment might be political favoritism
which corrupts an ordinary benefit program, investing complete discretion with the
decisionmaker, by favoring political supporters.
200. To a certain extent, discretionary acts will always result in arbitrary results. See id. at
178-79 (discussing the disparate effects of prosecution). However, one can reduce the amount
of arbitrary results by placing limits on the scope of discretion. See id. at 179 (asserting that
vindictiveness, when added to a claim of unequal treatment, will constitute a valid equal
protection claim, when the state action being charged is a discretionary action). I submit that if
"rational arbitrariness" (rationality) is a baseline limit on the initial screening procedures used to
process applications, the results of discretionary decisions become more fair. For example,
assume the state board of education receives three thousand applications for three scholarships
and the guiding factors for the decisionmaker are that (i) the applicant must be a minority and
(2) merit. The initial screening procedure could not include throwing out applications without
reviewing them, whether because of vindictiveness or laziness. Rather, each application would
demand a fair initial screening. This process would serve to narrow the pool of applicants to a
manageable number. However, assuming the pool narrows to thirty applicants that are virtually
identical and equally well qualified, the discretion of the decisionmaker would bar any claim
that a denial of the scholarship violated equal protection.
201. Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180.
202. See Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1972) (discussing the 1971 Supreme
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Professor Gunther, this "newer" equal protection jurisprudence "would have the
courts do more than they have done for the last generation to assure rationality
of means, without unduly impinging on legislative prerogatives regarding
ends.,,203 Indeed, to the extent that Bush v. Gore applied a means-oriented
scrutiny to strike down the manual recount of Florida's ballots, Professor
Gunther may have foreshadowed where the Court finds itself today.20 4
But, Professor Gunther also pointed out that the 1971 Court seemed to be
trending towards using means scrutiny as a narrower ground to decide divisive
issues.205 In addition, Gunther recognized that the Court seemed ready to apply
equal protection more broadly, stating that "the standards the Court applied in
[the 1971 Supreme Court] cases seem on their face applicable to a wide range
of statutory schemes. 20 6 Finally, he suggested that deciding a case under equal
protection might help a divided court find more common ground.20 7
Though written in 1971, Professor Gunther's statements hold true today.
With one noteworthy exception, 08 there remains a strong aversion to deciding
Court as utilizing equal protection "to intervene on the basis of the deferential standard [of
rational basis review]").
203. Id. at 23.
204. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) ("Having once granted the right to vote
on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's
vote over another."); see also Karlan, supra note 164, at 95 ("[M]ost of [the Court's] analysis
seems to rest not on traditional strict scrutiny forms of analysis, but rather on a perception that
Florida's scheme was simply arbitrary and therefore ran afoul of garden-variety rationality
review.").
205. See Gunther, supra note 202, at 29 (citing cases such as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(197 1), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), to illustrate the fact that the Court favored
"narrower, less divisive routes," rather than answering questions such as whether sex was a
suspect class or whether the right to privacy extended to unmarried persons seeking
contraceptives).
206. Id. at 33.
207. See id. at 40 ("[S]ome liberal Justices may find a more neutral and general concern for
property a small price to pay for continued protection of such favored interests as welfare
benefits."). Professor Gunther continued, "More broadly, Justices unable to persuade a majority
to extend new equal protection into novel spheres of strict scrutiny may well look favorably on
the half a loaf of more genuine rationality review of a wider range of legislation." Id.
208. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481-83 (2003) (reviving substantive due
process in determining that a Texas sodomy law violated petitioner's right to personal autonomy
to make decisions in a private, consensual relationship free from governmental interference). It
is unclear whether the Court will expand the understanding of liberty beyond the Lawrence
autonomy interests. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this "revival" of substantive due process
is an exception to their general policy to avoid deciding cases on this basis, or whether this
decision represents a turning point in the modem Court's jurisprudence. However, the
Lawrence Court did note that liberty interests may continuously be "discovered," as each
generation attempts to solidify its own understanding of the term. Id. at 2484. As Justice
Kennedy states:
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cases on the grounds of substantive due process. 09 According to Gunther, the
"means-focused" inquiry is found both in equal protection cases and
substantive due process cases. 2 '0 Gunther suggests, however, that the Court,
though desiring to be more interventionist, shies away from recognizing
substantive due process violations because the term "substantive due process"
carried a negative connotation in the minds of a substantial portion of the 1971
Court's Justices. 2 1 Thus, he finds that "evolution of constitutional doctrine in
the direction of the modestly interventionist model is likely to fare better along
the equal protection route than on the haunted paths of due process.
2 12
One can see the truth of Professor Gunther's statement when one evaluates
Judge Posner's vindictive-action equal protection cases.213 At the heart of
Judge Posner's concern are completely arbitrary and irrational government
actions.214 But, the Due Process Clause originally protected citizens from such
actions.21 5 Perhaps the Seventh Circuit's trend towards vindictive-action equal
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment
or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have
this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations
can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.
As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles
in their own search for greater freedom.
Id. Thus, it remains possible, though in this author's view unlikely, that the Court will entertain
an argument expanding liberty interests to include a freedom to be free from arbitrary
procedures.
209. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,271-72 (1994) ("As a general matter, the Court
has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended."
(quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))).
210. See Gunther, supra note 202, at 42 ("[T]he means-focused inquiry is as legitimate an
ingredient of due process as of equal protection.").
211. See id. at 42 ("But due process carries a repulsive connotation of value-laden
intervention for most of the Justices, of the Burger Court as well as the Warren Court.").
212. Id. at43.
213. See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998) ("(Tlhe
'vindictive action' class of equal protection cases requires proof that the cause of the differential
treatment of which the plaintiff complains was a totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff
by the defendant."); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995) ("If the power of the
government is brought to bear on a harmless individual merely because a powerful state or local
official harbors a malignant animosity toward him, the individual ought to have a remedy in
federal court.").
214. Id.; see also supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text (discussing the idea of
"irrational arbitrariness" as more appropriately limiting discretion).
215. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998) (stating that the
standard for reviewing executive actions under substantive due process is whether the action
"shocks the conscience"). See supra note 84 for a more comprehensive discussion of the case.
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protection and the Supreme Court's rational review in Bush v. Gore illustrate
Professor Gunther's observations regarding equal protection and due process
some thirty years after his analysis of the 1971 Supreme Court.
216
E. Summary
Using the theories underlying Bush v. Gore and Village of Willowbrook,
one can make a colorable claim that a state actor violates equal protection when
he denies an application for benefits under a standardless review process.1
What actions may an applicant challenge? According to the Seventh Circuit,
an applicant may challenge a denial of benefits, even if their disbursement is
discretionary, if the actor acts in a vindictive and arbitrary manner. 218 In
addition, an applicant may challenge a decision on the basis of equal protection
if a state actor treated a certain subset of applications differently from others,219
such as throwing away a large number of unanticipated applications to reduce
the administrative workload. And, it is clear that treating even one application
in a different manner from similarly situated applicants will give rise to a valid
equal protection claim. 220 However, equal protection most likely will not assist
the applicant whose application is accidentally lost in the administrative
process.22' In addition, the discretion of state actors maybe enough to deny an
equal protection claim to the ordinary denial of an application.222 Finally, equal
216. See Gunther, supra note 202, at 42-43 (concluding that the "modestly interventionist
model is likely to fare better along the equal protection route than on the haunted paths of due
process").
217. See supra Parts IV.A-IV.B (discussing the equal protection analysis in Bush v. Gore
and Village of Willowbrook).
218. See Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180 (finding plaintiff's allegation of an equal protection
violation asserted that his differential treatment was not a result of selective prosecution, but
"was a spiteful effort to 'get' him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state
objective").
219. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000) (per curiam) (finding that the
discretion of county canvassing boards to determine the intent of the voter must be guided by
specific standards to ensure equal evaluation of each ballot).
220. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,564 (2000) (per curiam) ("Our cases
have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,' where the
plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.").
221. Id. (stating that applicant must allege that the differential treatment was intentional).
222. See id. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring) (attempting to limit the case to contexts
where actual malice is alleged, as well as unequal treatment of similarly situated persons, in
order to limit the transformation of ordinary violations of city or state law into violations of the
Constitution).
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protection violations may be difficult to prove if the decisionmaking process
takes place behind closed doors and the applicant has no way to know whether
a decisionmaker actually reviewed her application. Thus, though equal
protection serves to protect applicants from several types of arbitrary actions, it
can only regulate the relationship between a person and his government in
limited ways, a situation in which the government may have the upper hand.223
V. Conclusion
It is clear that under the property interest paradigm, only those applicants
who can claim to meet the enumerated eligibility criteria for a mandated benefit
can claim a legitimate claim of entitlement. But, this paradigm suffers from
underinclusiveness. Consider the example from the beginning of this Note:
Assume that the shredded applications were applications for a state scholarship
program, a benefit program which gave the decisionmaker wide discretion in
awarding three scholarships. Assume further that the decisionmaker shredded
half of the applications because the program received an unanticipated number
of applications and the decisionmaker did not want to put in the extra time to
review them all individually.
Under the property interest paradigm, an applicant whose application was
shredded could not challenge this action because she could assert no property
interest in the application. However, this paradigm is a useful tool for some
applicants who can point to less vague statutes or program requirements. Thus,
an applicant should always assert a claim for procedural due process under the
current property regime, as it is the most well-established method of gaining
procedural protections for such applications for benefits.
After twenty-five years, Van Alstyne's solution to the application for
benefits problem is still persuasive. The freedom to be free from procedural
grossness, located under substantive due process, lends procedural protections
to any applicant, no matter how small the interest in the benefit may be, or how
much discretion the legislature vests with the decisionmaker.224 Van Alstyne
223. See Reich, supra note 69, at 746 (discussing how distribution of government largess
expands the government's power). Specifically, Reich noted that "(w]hen government-
national, state or local-hands out something of value, whether a relief check or a television
license, government's power grows forthwith; it automatically gains such power as is necessary
and proper to supervise its largess. It obtains new rights to investigate, to regulate, and to
punish." Id.; see also Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that
even if a plaintiff may bring a vindictive-action equal protection claim, the plaintiff is not likely
to find "ultimate victory").
224. See supra Part Ill (discussing the merits and broad application of Van AIstyne's
theory).
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captures the essence of the Court's statements regarding due process: "[T]he
touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action
of the government. ''2 In addition, the Court appears more willing to locate
liberty interests outside of state law, whereas the general rule seems to be that
property interests must be created by positive law.226 Van Alstyne's approach
also recognizes dignitary interests,227 and reinforces an individual's logical
expectation that, at a minimum, the government will treat each applicant
rationally and review his application. 2 ' However, whether the Court will
honor such a claim under a freedom to be free from procedural arbitrariness
remains to be seen.
Continuing the scholarship hypothetical from the preceding paragraph, the
victim of a shredding campaign could challenge the shredding action under
substantive due process, stating that the decisionmaker acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner by failing to review or consider her application for the
scholarship. If the Court accepts a substantive due process freedom to be free
from procedural arbitrariness argument, this victim would most likely win her
claim. The remedy the Court would use would not be the benefit itself, but a
vindication of the plaintiff's rights triggering enough procedural safeguards to
ensure that the state and decisionmaker honor the plaintiff's liberty interest.
Finally, Bush v. Gore and Village of Willowbrook breathe new life into a
potential claim for an applicant who feels a decisionmaker has arbitrarily
denied her application. Under Bush v. Gore, it appears that evaluation
techniques must be standardized, so that each ballot (or application, for the
purposes of this Note) receives similar review.229 Under Village of
Willowbrook, an individual, class-of-one plaintiff may posit a realistic equal
225. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding that substantive due process includes "freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints and... also recognizes,
what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment" (citations omitted)).
226. See supra note 86 (discussing the differences in locating a property right under state
law and locating a liberty interest under state law and the Due Process Clause).
227. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 484-88 (discussing the fact that following
procedural safeguards has traditionally been seen as synonymous with the meaning of liberty
and finding that the notion of fairness can be observed in locating such a freedom); see also
Saphire, supra note 174, at 119-25 (arguing that dignity interests should help guide the notion
of fairness in due process).
228. Saphire, supra note 174, at 159; see also supra note 154 (discussing case law that
endorses the idea that the Due Process Clause serves, in part, to respect an individual's dignitary
interests).
229. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the potentially broad application of Bush v. Gore and
the minimum rationality standard set forth by the Court).
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protection claim that she was treated differently from similarly situated
individuals.23° In addition, broadening the Seventh Circuit scope of vindictive-
action equal protection to irrational arbitrariness equal protection may also support a
plaintiffs desire for equal treatment when it comes to the evaluation of her
application.
2'
Under an equal protection argument, the victim of the shredding spree
hypothetical above will most likely prove her assertion that the decisionmaker
treated the applicant and her application differently from other similarly situated
applicants and applications, whether the action was motivated by vindictiveness or
pure laziness--assuming, in the first place, that she learns that her application
suffered such a fate. The only situation where such a claim would fail would be a
case where the decisionmaker shredded all applications or treated all applicants in a
similar arbitrary manner.
As modem Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests an unwillingness to ftuther
extend substantive due process, 232 a disappointed applicant should attempt to assert
her claim, stating that the decisionmaker denied her right to equal protection. As
evidenced in Bush v. Gore and Village of Willowbrook, although complaints of
arbitrariness constituted the heart of the plaintiffs' claims, it proved easier to claim a
denial of equal protection than a denial of a right under substantive due process that
complained of arbitrariness.233 Professor Gunther realized this back in 1971 when
he stated, "[E]volution of constitutional doctrine in the direction of the modestly
interventionist model is likely to fare better along the equal protection route than on
the haunted paths of due process.
2 34
230. See supra Part IV.B (discussing Village of Willowbrook and its contributions to an equal
protection attack on the arbitrary denial of a benefit application).
231. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the nature of vindictive-action equal protection cases
and elaborating on the root concern of judges who honor such claims).
232. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,271-72(1994) ("Asa general matter, the Court has
always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." (quoting Collins
v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472,2481-
83 (2003) (apparently reviving substantive due process). For further discussion of Lawrence, see
supra note 208.
233. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000) (evaluating the Florida Supreme Court's
order that the intent of the voter should be determined in recounts and determining that the
measures taken by the county canvassing boards to observe the Florida Supreme Court's decision
did "not satisfy the minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure
the fundamental right"); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per
curiam) ("'[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure
every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents."' (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,445 (1923))).
234. Gunther, supra note 202, at 43.
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